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ZONING CYBERSPACE: PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL 
UPSIDE DOWN 
 
Raymond H. Brescia* 
 
[I]n the beginning, all the world was America.1 
 
Abstract 
Over fifty years ago, Charles Reich posited that we should extend 
property protections to what he would call “government largess”: that 
array of interests—from licenses to welfare benefits—that often form the 
bases for one’s economic existence in the modern world. Reich considered 
such protections essential to the preservation of individual autonomy, the 
independence that is critical to a functioning democracy. Today, our most 
personal information and even our thoughts, as reflected in our online 
activities and digital existence, are subject to “private largess.” Private 
entities possess information central to the identity of those individuals who 
utilize their services. This information exists in a digital “upside down,” 
to borrow a phrase from popular culture: an almost parallel universe or 
shadow world where our most intimate details are open to inspection and 
acquisition by third parties without our informed consent. Indeed, only a 
relatively weak set of institutions stand in the way, if they offer any 
resistance at all, to the sharing of such information by these entities in 
ways that undermine what I refer to throughout this piece as the integrity 
of identity: what should be a protected sphere of personal interests, 
desires, affiliations, and even our beliefs that make up the self. As we face 
calls for greater surveillance in the throes of the novel coronavirus (SARS-
CoV-2) crisis, concerns that privacy protections will further erode loom 
large. Moreover, any crisis-intervention measures may never be rolled 
back when the acute crisis dissipates. 
While much privacy scholarship focuses on the personal, individual, 
and private rights such risks to privacy entail, I will focus on the dangers 
                                               
* © 2020 Raymond H. Brescia. Hon. Harold R. Tyler Chair in Law & Technology and 
Professor of Law, Albany Law School. I would like to thank the following individuals for 
their insights and comments on prior drafts of this Article, including Guido Calabresi, 
Ximena Benavides, Anupam Chander, Rodger Citron and Nestor M. Davidson. I am also 
deeply grateful for the assistance and support from my colleagues Ava Ayers, Ted 
DeBarbieri, Robert Heverly, Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, and Sarah Rogerson. I would also 
like to thank my research assistants for their valuable contributions to this effort as well: 
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1 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 49 (Project Gutenberg, 2010) 
(1689). 
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these threats pose to democracy by undermining the integrity of identity 
and the collective goods that democracy produces. In a landmark article, 
Calabresi and Melamed argued that we should protect different 
entitlements through those rules that produce desired results in society, 
including solving collective action problems. They would classify these 
different approaches as either property, liability, or alienability rules. This 
Article draws from and builds upon the work of Reich, Calabresi, and 
Melamed to argue that, as in several property law contexts, from the 
mortgage market to zoning, where we use what I call “hybrid” rules—
rules that combine elements of property, liability and alienability 
approaches—to solve collective action problems, we should see the 
problem of privacy in the digital world as a collective action problem that 
requires similar, hybrid solutions. Indeed, this Article argues for a form 
of what I call digital zoning that utilizes all three approaches in the 
Calabresi and Melamed taxonomy through hybrid rules to help preserve 




On the eve of the American Revolution, when the British controlled the official 
postal system, the mails were neither protected nor private.2 British officials could 
read the letters and newspaper tracts that they transported through the official postal 
system.3 Because of the threat to the privacy of their correspondence, many rebel 
colonists feared punishment should they express sentiments, in writing, in favor of 
independence.4 Moreover, printers at the time, both Tory and rebel, were subject to 
violence by angry mobs. When British forces occupied Boston, several printers were 
referred to as “trumpeters of sedition” who should be “put to the sword” if found by 
British troops.5 To evade British oversight, correspondents used private messengers 
to circumvent the official postal system.6 At the urging of a newspaper publisher 
from Baltimore who had started a private route between that city and Philadelphia, 
agitators in Boston advocated for the creation of a new communications network 
throughout the colonies that was independent of the official British one.7 They 
argued that the cost associated with the official system was a tax that lined the coffers 
of the British government, that British surveillance of their correspondence chilled 
freedom of thought and expression, and that an independent postal system would 
                                               
2 Joseph M. Adelman, “A Constitutional Conveyance of Intelligence, Public and 
Private”: The Post Office, the Business of Printing, and the American Revolution, 11 ENTER. 
& SOC’Y 709, 717 (2010). 
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 JOHN BYRNE COOKE, REPORTING THE WAR: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 13–14 (2008). 
6 See Adelman, supra note 2, at 718. 
7 Id. at 724. 
 
2020] ZONING CYBERSPACE 1221 
foster a more cohesive colonial body.8 When the Continental Congress met in 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1775, before even voting for independence, it created 
a new postal system called the Constitutional Post, with routes from Maine to 
Georgia, naming Benjamin Franklin as the first postmaster general.9  
Without the ability to communicate privately and engage in collective action, 
to identify themselves as revolutionaries, to claim a new American identity, and to 
communicate all of that information securely and with other like-minded people, the 
world-historical acts that brought about American independence might have never 
occurred.10 Today, protesters around the world are nervous that their identity, 
reflected in their online and analog activity, will be utilized to oppress them and 
suppress efforts to nurture democracy and the realization of self-determination.11 A 
dramatic public health crisis is already generating even greater surveillance 
measures, and these are unlikely to be scaled back once the crisis subsides.12 
This historical record reveals that threats to privacy and the integrity of identity 
threaten democracy. This integrity of identity—the maintenance of a private sphere 
of information that is central to our core sense of self—is critical to the pursuit of 
both individual and collective self-determination.13 Moreover, essential benefits 
                                               
8 Id. at 733–36. 
9 Id. at 739. 
10 See 2 DAVID RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 405–10 
(Liberty Fund, Inc. 1990) (1789) (highlighting the role of the press in turning the public’s 
sentiments against Great Britain’s offers of conciliation during the American Revolution). 
11 As just one example of this phenomenon, agitation and surveillance related to both 
analog and digital identities have come together in Hong Kong, as both sides in the street 
protests are using facial recognition software to monitor opponents’ activities. Paul Mozur, 
In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recognition-
surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/VM8K-XHZB]. Of course, it is not just protesters that 
are concerned about their digital privacy. Brooke Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson, 
Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kumar, & Erica Turner, Americans and Privacy: Concerned, 
Confused and Feeling Lack of Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Nov. 15, 2019) (showing majority of Americans concerned about digital privacy). 
12 Iain Marlow, Virus Hands World Leaders Sweeping Powers They May Never Give 
Up, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-
25/virus-gives-world-leaders-sweeping-powers-they-may-never-give-up [https://perma.cc/ 
5MX9-9C58]. 
13 Here, I use the term “integrity” not in the sense that one maintains a consistent set of 
personal values, but rather that a condition, like identity, is complete or unimpaired. See 
Integrity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integrity 
[https://perma.cc/66ZT-9R56] (last visited June 17, 2020); cf. Andrew B. Ayers, The Half-
Virtuous Integrity of Atticus Finch, 86 MISS. L.J. 33, 34 (2017) (distinguishing between the 
integrity of identity—understood as the psychological coherence of the self—and moral 
integrity—understood as consistency with one’s moral values). And while there is some 
overlap between identity in the way in which I am using it and the term “identity politics,” 
the sense that one can associate one’s identity with a particular racial, ethnic, or other group, 
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accrue from the preservation of the individual’s integrity of identity because of the 
central role that such integrity plays in framing and interpreting grievances and 
injustices,14 collective meaning-making,15 the realization of self-determination, the 
creation of social capital and societal trust, and the bringing about of social change. 
More than fifty years ago, before the advent of the digital age, Charles Reich 
argued for the extension of property protections to an array of interests—from 
licenses to welfare benefits—that often serve as the basis of one’s economic 
existence in the modern world.16 Such interests, what he described as government 
“[b]enefits, subsidies, and privileges,”17 were subject to the whims of a capricious 
government, or “government largess,”18 that would lead individuals in society to 
“[s]eek[] to stay on the safe side of an uncertain, often unknowable line . . . .”19 
Those “dependent on largess” were “likely to eschew any activities that might incur 
official displeasure,” and would “fear to offend, lest ways and means be found, in 
the obscure corners of discretion, to deny these favors in the future.”20 For Reich, to 
protect the integrity of individual autonomy, the recognition of property rights in 
such interests was essential not only to preserve personal liberty but also to maintain 
democracy.21  
  
                                               
and such identification can lead to collective mobilization activated by that identity, I am 
speaking more consciously about how identity and the integrity of identity are closely 
associated with individual notions of the self. For a criticism of so-called identity politics, 
see MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS 58–59 (2017) 
(decrying as divisive what is described as identity politics); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY: 
THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT, loc 2215 (Kindle ed. 2019) 
(criticizing identity politics as practiced on the left and the right as “deeply problematic” 
because it utilizes aspects of identity which are described as fixed). But cf. Stacey Y. Abrams, 
Identity Politics Strengthens Democracy, 98 FOREIGN AFFS. 160, 163 (2019) (arguing that 
by “embracing identity and its prickly, uncomfortable contours, Americans will become 
more likely to grow as one”). 
14 On the relationship between grievance interpretation, identity, and what are known 
as collective-action frames, see David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and 
Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 136–38 (Aldon D. 
Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992). 
15 Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) 
(“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it 
and give it meaning.”). 
16 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785–86 (1964). 
17 Id. at 749. 
18 See id. at 734–39. While largess can certainly have positive connotations, Reich saw 
that the growth of government largess and its reach into virtually every corner of the 
economy had serious ramifications for individual autonomy, leading to a dependency on the 
whims of the government for wealth and well-being. See id. at 771. 
19 Id. at 751. 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 771–74. 
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Today, our most personal information and even our thoughts, as reflected in 
our online activities and digital existence, are subject to “private largess.” Private 
entities possess highly personal and private information about us and can share it 
with relative impunity. Like the fears expressed by Reich of the perniciousness of 
government largess, this cache of seemingly private information in possession of 
private entities leaves many individuals at the mercy of these entities in terms of 
how they use such information and with whom they share it. This information exists 
in a digital “upside down,” an almost parallel universe or shadow world where our 
most intimate details are open to inspection and acquisition by third parties without 
our consent, or with an extremely thin form of consent that is secured without a full 
appreciation for the scope of information known about us and how it may be used.22 
These threats to privacy undermine the integrity of identity: that sphere of personal 
interests, desires, affiliations, and beliefs that make up the self.23 Yet it is the self, 
the individual, that stands at the center of liberal democracies, making both 
individual and collective self-determination possible; reflexively, both types of self-
determination are central to democracy as well.24 The products of these forms of 
self-determination are often public and collective goods, including the democratic 
form of government itself.25 But these products are under threat due to the risks 
                                               
22 In the Netflix original series Stranger Things, the “Upside Down” is described as an 
“alternate reality existing in parallel to the human world.” The Upside Down, STRANGER 
THINGS WIKI, http://strangerthings.wikia.com/wiki/The_Upside_Down [https://perma.cc/3T 
98-S8BY] (last visited June 17, 2020). Venture capitalist Roger McNamee has used similarly 
colorful language to describe the information technology companies collect as “data voodoo 
dolls,” the “digital profiles they develop for each user.” Brian Barth, Big Tech’s Big Defector, 
THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/02/big-
techs-big-defector [https://perma.cc/2QCV-R9JQ]. Technology reporter Farhad Manjoo 
recently described a day in which he could see how much of his digital activities were tracked 
in “obscene detail,” proclaiming that “[t]his is happening every day, all the time, and the 
only reason we’re O.K. with it is that it’s happening behind the scenes, in the comfortable 
shadows.” Farhad Manjoo, I Visited 47 Websites. Hundreds of Trackers Followed Me, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/23/opinion/data-internet-privacy-
tracking.html [https://perma.cc/96R4-GUCQ] (last visited June 22, 2020). See also JOSEPH 
TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR 
IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 79 (2011) (“The rise of a market in impressions has naturally 
stimulated unprecedented data-collecting activity related to individuals.”). 
23 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (2d ed. 
1998) (describing the “more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken 
together partly define the person I am”). 
24 On the interplay between collective self-determination and individual autonomy and 
identity, see Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF. 
L. REV. 429, 439–42 (1998). On the role of digital privacy in preserving individual 
autonomy, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and 
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 563–64 (1995). On the 
relationship between individual and collective self-determination, see infra Part I.A.  
25 Public goods scholarship often fails to distinguish between, and blends the concepts 
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posed by a lack of digital privacy in the hands of private actors. As with Reich’s 
concerns over the risks posed to privacy, autonomy, and self-determination by 
unchecked government largess, there is an equal, if not greater, concern associated 
with the risks posed by private largess to individual autonomy and democratic self-
governance.26 This Article’s normative claim is that we should consider setting rules 
concerning digital privacy that will offer greater protections for certain types of 
activities that lend themselves to these public and collective goods: a form of “digital 
zoning” that will attempt to protect the integrity of identity and preserve the central 
role it plays in the formation of personal identity, the preservation of which is 
essential to any functioning democracy.27 
Given the critical importance of the integrity of identity to the functioning of 
democracies, it is appropriate to consider the legal institutions in place that presently 
guard this integrity against the whims of private largess to determine whether they 
are adequate to such a weighty task. Traditionally, the integrity of identity has been 
protected by a collection of privacy-based protections through what are generally 
considered liability rules.28 Liability rules provide remedies focused on addressing 
harms that affect individuals.29 These rules mostly offer relief for breaches of 
privacy through ex post damage awards to individual victims of such infractions.30 
Yet, in many ways, we often conceptualize privacy as something that inures to 
                                               
of, “public goods” and “collective goods,” but I choose to use the term collective goods to 
refer to the goods that come from collective action, which often begin by benefiting the 
members of the collective enterprise and can have spillover effects on the broader 
community. For a discussion of collective goods and public goods that views them as mostly 
interchangeable, see PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 227–31 (1995). This is similar to the use of the term “club 
goods” in some scholarship; these are the benefits that are derived from membership in a 
group that shares the burdens of the production of goods and only members share in those 
benefits. For a discussion of club goods, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE 
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 347–51 (2d ed. 1996). For a 
discussion of public goods, like civil rights, that are a product of collective action, see 
DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2–4 (1991). 
26 On Reich’s views of government largess, see infra Part II.B. 
27 See infra Part IV. 
28 Here, I explicitly borrow from Calabresi and Melamed’s taxonomy of rules that 
govern the protection of different interests. See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (articulating liability rules as a concept protecting entitlements). 
29 See id. at 1092. For a discussion of privacy’s individualistic focus, see Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 
96 GEO. L.J. 123, 128–33 (2007). 
30 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092. As I will show throughout this piece, 
however, privacy is often protected by more than liability rules alone. See, e.g., Matthew B. 
Kugler & Thomas H. Rousse, The Privacy Hierarchy: Trade Secret and Fourth Amendment 
Expectations, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1223, 1235–39 (discussing the interrelationship between 
privacy, trespass, and property protections).  
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individuals, even though threats to digital privacy pose problems for collective 
action and the public goods that privacy generates: social capital, societal trust, and 
social change that emanates from social movements.31 Moreover, entities with 
access to private information about those utilizing digital services are largely free to 
share this information broadly, and for profit. This is the private largess problem, 
and it arises as a result of several phenomena, which together create a form of moral 
hazard: a virtually lawless space in which rent-seeking is likely. Such phenomena 
include the following: asymmetry of information regarding the purposes and uses of 
private information; opacity in waiver rules related to those purposes and uses; and 
legislative and adjudicative immunity for breaches of different aspects of privacy, 
particularly in the online space.32 For these reasons, the providers of a wide array of 
modern technologies have largely avoided responsibility for the most serious 
breaches of privacy and threats to identity that arise today.33 Generally speaking, 
lawlessness, impunity, and the collective harms they create result in a collective 
action problem, requiring a collective solution. As a result, strategies to address these 
threats must see the problem as such: a collective action problem that requires 
collective—rather than individualized and atomistic—solutions.34  
In a highly influential article, Calabresi and Melamed argue that legal disputes 
surrounding different types of legal interests can trigger collective action problems.35 
As a result, different types of rules should be deployed to regulate such interests in 
different contexts.36 Similarly, given the collective action problem posed by the 
private largess phenomenon, it is appropriate to question whether the current privacy 
law regime, centered around liability rules alone, can protect the digital preserve of 
information that can reflect, if not constitute, one’s identity and explore whether 
more robust property rules, coupled with inalienability rules, are better suited to 
promote and protect the integrity of identity that is essential to self-determination 
and the functioning of democracy.37  
While some legal scholarship discusses the potential role that property rules 
could play in preserving individual privacy, rarely does such scholarship address the 
collective dimensions of privacy and the role privacy protections can play in 
promoting collective action.38 In recent years, we have learned more about the 
                                               
31 See infra Part II.C. 
32 For a discussion of the different types of immunity granted to business entities in 
their digital activities, see infra Part III.A.  
33 See infra Part II.A. 
34 See infra Part III.C.  
35 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1089–93. 
36 See infra Part I.C. 
37 On the notion of privacy “preserves,” see Erving Goffman, The Territories of the 
Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28, 38–40 (1971). 
Reich would call for protection of property interests through “sanctuaries or enclaves where 
no majority can reach.” Reich, supra note 16, at 787. 
38 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 
834–36 (2000) (arguing privacy protections are “constitutive” of society but not discussing 
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threats to digital privacy and the potential ramifications they have for self-
determination and democracy.39 With greater knowledge of the threats to the 
integrity of identity as these threats unfold in real-time, and with a greater focus on 
not just the public good of privacy but also the collective goods it generates, this 
Article offers theoretical, historical, and practical support for the notion that the 
conjoined interests in privacy and the integrity of identity should enjoy stronger 
protection than what presently exists. It will examine several fundamental areas 
where the applicable rules blend concepts more prevalent in liability systems with 
those of traditional property law to address critical collective action problems to 
assess whether they might be useful and effective in protecting privacy in private 
law settings.40 Indeed, I argue that these hybrid approaches—used at present in the 
landlord-tenant, mortgage, zoning, and restrictive covenant contexts of property 
law—can serve the privacy domain well. This Article will explore how we might 
utilize similar hybrid approaches to preserve the integrity of identity.  
With these goals in mind, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I will review 
the origins of contemporary property law and show how early theorists often tied 
the importance of protecting property to notions of the self.41 Despite this apparent 
connection, what we have come to know as the right to privacy did not emerge until 
the late 19th century. The effort to recognize this right was, in many ways, a product 
of an explicit attempt to decouple it from property protections.42 After tracing the 
emergence of this right to privacy in the late 19th century, this Part will then identify 
the extent to which the current approach to privacy is mostly governed by liability 
rules as opposed to property or inalienability rules.43 Part II will then ask whether, 
in light of contemporary technologies and the threat they pose to the integrity of 
identity, the time is right to rethink whether liability rules alone are sufficient to 
protect privacy, the integrity of identity, and the collective goods they generate. It 
will introduce the notion of private largess described earlier: the idea that much of 
our online presence is protected mostly at the whim of private entities, with few 
effective protections to ensure the integrity of identity. It goes on to argue that, given 
the nature of privacy interests and the critical role they play in generating collective 
goods (i.e., identity formation, social capital, social movements, and democracy), a 
new regime, one informed by more robust rules, is appropriate for the preservation 
of the integrity of identity. Part III then explores some of the ways that property and 
inalienability rules have been invoked to preserve property interests in several 
settings that might help inform the search for approaches to ensure the effective 
protection of the integrity of identity. Part IV then describes the contours of a hybrid-
                                               
the public goods that privacy generates or the role privacy plays in collective action); Julie 
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912–18 (2013) (describing 
importance of privacy to democracy). 
39 See infra Part II.C. 
40 See infra Part IV. 
41 See infra Part I.A. 
42 See infra Part I.B. 
43 See infra Part 1.C. 
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rules-informed regime for the protection of privacy, examining ways that hybrid 
liability-property-inalienability rules—centered around a form of digital zoning—
might preserve the integrity of identity. 
 
I.  PROTECTING AUTONOMY 
 
Threats to individual autonomy, no matter their source, threaten democracy.44 
Protections that maintain this autonomy are central to the search for the self that is 
essential to any effort to achieve true self-determination.45 A deep connection 
between individual autonomy, democracy, and property has long existed in Western 
political thought.46 This Part explores the emergence and evolution of this 
connection. 
 
A.  The Connections Between Identity, the Self, and Property in Early Property 
Theory and Its Relationship to Contemporary Thought 
 
Foreshadowing what would become the Kantian principle that the individual 
should be treated as an end and not a means,47 Locke would stake out what is often 
referred to as the labor theory of property. When one mixes his or her labor with a 
thing, like a field, the fruit of that mixture becomes the individual’s property.48 For 
Locke, “[t]he labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his.”49 When the individual “removes [something] out of the state that nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”50 Locke believed that we are not 
truly free if the things we do with our bodies do not become our own.51 In many 
ways, this thinking says much about property theory—where it has become highly 
                                               
44 On the relationship between self-determination and liberal democracy, see Daniel 
Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, 105 ETHICS 352, 355–58 (1995). 
45 See Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of 
Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 408 (2009) 
(“Participation in a democracy requires individuals to have an underlying capacity for self-
determination, which requires some personal privacy.”). 
46 See Post, supra note 24, at 439–42 (discussing the interplay between collective self-
determination and individual autonomy). 
47 IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 18 
(Thomas Abbot trans., Project Gutenberg 10th ed. 2018) (1785) (expressing injunction to 
treat all individuals as ends and not means). Charles Fried would use similar language with 
respect to privacy—that it is an end in itself, and not just a means to an end. Charles Fried, 
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968). 
48 LOCKE, supra note 1, ¶ 27.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. See also Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information 
Control, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 365, 367–68 (1998) (describing Lockean theory of property 
acquisition). 
51 LOCKE, supra note 1, § 27.  
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influential in modern thought—but also about the self. The self is free to act, and the 
product of any such act or acts become the property of the self.52 In these ways, 
Locke would not just argue for recognition of the individual as an end and not a 
means, but also that the product of the self’s actions should become his or her own 
as a result.53 The recognition of the capacity to, by one’s own labor, come into 
possession of a thing was, in fact, a recognition of the inviolate nature of the self: 
that the individual could not become a means to the ends of another and that he or 
she enjoyed a degree of autonomy to act and acquire and pursue the objects of the 
self’s desire.54 This autonomy would find its way into public relations. Government, 
according to Locke, “cannot take from any man any part of his property without his 
consent . . . .”55 Since individuals “enter into societ[ies]” with governments for “the 
preservation of [their] property,”56 Locke would claim that it would be “too gross an 
absurdity” to have a government that deprived them of that very property.57 For these 
reasons, “[m]en . . . in society hav[e] property, [which means that] they have such a 
right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath 
a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent 
. . . .”58 As Locke would argue, every individual is entitled to “that equal right, that 
every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or 
authority of any other man.”59 
These notions of the self, property, and autonomy are engrained in the civic 
republicanism of the founders,60 who believed that one of the main reasons for 
protecting property, which was at risk under an imperial rule from across the 
Atlantic, was the autonomy it afforded the individual. In turn, such property enabled 
the individual to participate in the processes of democracy.61 The economic security 
                                               
52 See, e.g., E. J. Hundert, The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke Between Ideology 
and History, 33 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 9 (1972) (describing Locke’s view that “[o]ne’s property 
was the extension of self by virtue of the injection of personality into nature through work”). 
53 Despite this strong statement on the right to the fruits of one’s labor, Locke had an 
inconsistent approach toward slavery. See SEYMOUR DRESCHER, CAPITALISM AND 
ANTISLAVERY 23–24 (1987) (noting Locke’s differing positions on slavery). 
54 See KANT, supra note 47, at 18. 
55 LOCKE, supra note 1, § 138. For Locke, property interests could manifest themselves 
in both tangible and intangible objects, and both held critical roles in self-development. See 
Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891, 
945 (2006) (“[F]or Locke, self-development requires property and this requires not only 
tangible assets, but also cultural and social properties. Both tangible and intangible properties 
improve the conveniences of life.”) (footnote omitted). 
56 LOCKE, supra note 1, § 138. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. § 54. 
60 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540 
(1988) (“Republican thought played a central role in the framing period, and it offers a 
powerful conception of politics and of the functions of constitutionalism.”). 
61 Akhil Amar describes the republican tradition as “basically one in which there is a 
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that came with the protection of property led to political autonomy: an individual 
could participate as an independent actor, not dependent on the whims of others, in 
the functioning of democracy, and thus realize the self-determination at the heart of 
the democratic experiment.62 Gordon Wood explains that in classical republican 
thought, property “had been considered in proprietary terms as part of a person’s 
identity and the source of his authority.”63 This civic republican ideal was captured 
by Pocock, who found that it emanated from the Western philosophical and political 
tradition, with roots in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas.64 According to Pocock, 
civic republicans believed “[p]roperty was both an extension and a prerequisite of 
personality,” and it was possible “that different modes of property may be seen as 
generating or encouraging different modes of personality[].”65 In this view, the 
“citizen possessed property in order to be autonomous and autonomy was necessary 
for him to develop virtue or goodness as an actor within the political, social and 
natural realm or order.”66 It was not possessed “in order to engage in trade, exchange 
or profit; indeed, these activities were hardly compatible with the activity of 
citizenship.”67 
Among American founders, nowhere is this connection between property, the 
integrity of identity, and autonomy perhaps more apparent than in the thought of 
James Madison. In an essay on property published in 1792, he would argue that 
property, in one sense, means “that dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”68 He 
would also argue, however, that “[i]n its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every 
thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every 
                                               
recognition that in order for one truly to be a citizen in a democracy and to participate in its 
democratic process, one needs a minimum amount of [economic] independence.” Akhil Reed 
Amar, Republicanism and Minimal Entitlements: Of Safety Valves and the Safety Net, 11 
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 47, 48 (1988). See also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & 
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970 
68 (1998) (arguing that, for the Federalists, “[p]roperty strongly symbolized stability and 
assured the conditions that were necessary for the exercise of one’s skills in the public 
sphere”) (footnote omitted). 
62 To quote Amar again on the republican tradition in relation to the value of property, 
“a minimal entitlement to property is so important, so constitutive, and so essential for both 
individual and collective self-governance that to provide each citizen with that minimal 
amount of property, the government may legitimately redistribute property from other 
citizens who have far more than their minimal share.” Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a 
Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37 
(1990). 
63 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 269 (1992). 




68 James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792). 
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one else the like advantage.”69 An individual has property, in both senses of 
Madison’s use of the term, in not just “land, or merchandize, or money,” but also in 
that individual’s “opinions and the free communication of them.”70 These included 
“a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and 
practice dictated by them.”71 The individual also possesses “an equal property in the 
free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.”72 
In these ways, for Madison, just as the individual “is said to have a right to his 
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.” Madison also 
believed that tyranny was marked by threats to property in this broader sense of the 
term. As he would write, “Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is 
duly respected. No man is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his 
possessions.”73 In one of Madison’s famous Federalist essays, he would blend the 
notion of individuals’ faculties and their ability to secure property; further, the object 
of government was the protection of such faculties.74 
Erik Olson has described the civic republican view of property, its relation to 
the self, and the cultivation of civic virtue in a democracy as follows: “given the 
right conditions, property might be thought of as part of the ethical and civic 
situation of the self; to be sure, not in the sense that the mere acquisition of property 
is a moral or civic end in itself, but rather in the sense—the Aristotelian sense—that 
it is an instrument which, when used properly, can contribute to the cultivation and 
practice of moral and civic virtue.”75 In this tradition, the “patriot,” protected by 
property rights and enjoying property interests, had political autonomy, and he or 
she was an “individual rendered independent by . . . property and permitted an 
autonomous engagement in public affairs.”76 The very function of the property of 
the patriot or citizen “was to give him independence and autonomy as well as the 
leisure and liberty to engage in public affairs.”77  
  
                                               
69 Id. (emphasis in original). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. Mary Ann Glendon would go even farther, arguing that “the very structure of our 
government was developed around the problem of protecting private property.” MARY ANN 
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 25 (1991). 
73 Madison, supra note 68. 
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (asserting that government’s “first object” 
is to protect the faculties which allow men to acquire property). 
75 ERIK J. OLSON, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES OF DEMOCRACY 119 
(2006). 
76 Id. at 109. 
77 Id. In the colonial era, many argued for voting rights to be connected to and dependent 
upon property ownership. One of the justifications for this position was “only those with a 
property stake in the nation had the responsibility and permanence necessary for participation 
in its councils.” FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1985).  
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Cass Sunstein argues that civic republicans “have historically believed in the 
importance of property rights as a shield against the state and as a guarantor of 
security, independence, and virtue.”78 Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon explains that 
civic republicans embraced a “vision of freedom that appealed to Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists alike” in which “[i]n a very concrete way, property could be seen 
to promote independence and personal security for the majority of white male 
inhabitants.”79 
According to Carol Rose, a wide and fairly equal distribution of property in the 
early republic was seen as justified because “property lent independence to 
individuals and that independence enabled them to exercise the autonomous 
judgment necessary for their common self-rule.”80 In turn, the relative economic 
equality had certain effects on political equality. The early days of the republic were 
marred by a disparity in wealth, and dramatic differences in political and economic 
power centered around gender and especially race.81 Nevertheless, at least with 
respect to white men, Tocqueville would note that, among all of his observations 
about the new nation in the early 19th century, nothing would strike him “more 
forcibly than the general equality of conditions”82 and this equality gave “a certain 
direction to public opinion, and a certain tenor to the laws . . . .”83 This equality was 
“the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, and the central point 
at which all my observations constantly terminated.”84 
Following the American Revolution, Freidrich Hegel would theorize on the 
connection of the self, or what he would describe as the individual’s will, to property. 
For Hegel, “[a] person has the right to direct his will upon any object, as his real and 
positive end.”85 Through this process, “[t]he object thus becomes his.”86 Because 
that object “has no end in itself, it receives its meaning and soul from [the 
                                               
78 Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1551 (footnote omitted). 
79 GLENDON, supra note 72, at 25. Seen in this light, one’s home was a “sanctuary” and 
an individual’s “castle.” Id. 
80 CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 61 (1994) (footnote omitted). Reich would echo such 
sentiments. Reich, supra note 16, at 771 (“[P]roperty performs the function of maintaining 
independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority 
has to yield to the owner.”).  
81 For an analysis of economic inequality in the immediate, post-colonial era, see 
generally PETER H. LINDERT & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, UNEQUAL GAINS: AMERICAN 
GROWTH AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1700, 79–85 (2016). 
82 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA xxix (Henry Reeve trans., D. 
Appleton & Co. 1899) (1835). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. On the concerns for economic inequality that animated James Madison in drafting 
the U.S. Constitution, see, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS 
CONSTITUTION 99–104 (2017). 
85 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 44, at 6 (S.W. 
Dyde trans., Dover Publ’ns 2005) (1820). 
86 Id. 
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individual’s] will.”87 In these ways, the self is only instantiated through the desire to 
acquire objects, and by acquiring such objects, one realizes, in the material world, 
the very essence of the self, i.e., the individual’s thoughts and desires.88 As Hegel 
would explain, “when I as a free will am in possession of something, I get a tangible 
existence, and in this way first became an actual will.”89 This was the “true and legal 
nature of property, and constitutes its distinctive character.”90 In turn, the recognition 
of those objects, which were the reification of the self, was seen by Hegel “as a 
medium for the expression of personality and therefore crucial to realizing the 
individual dignity we often associate with liberalism.”91 
Locke and Hegel would influence the development of modern property law in 
the United States,92 especially in the “Property as Personhood” school of property 
scholarship most closely associated with Margaret Jane Radin.93 For Radin, the 
individual desires ownership over certain objects, what she calls “personal 
property,” because they are so closely associated with and even constitutive of the 
self: for example, a wedding ring, one’s childhood home, etc. As Radin explains, 
“Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These 
objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we 
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.”94 Such property 
interests are so closely associated with one’s personality and self that they are 
entitled to higher-order protections than other types of property because “to achieve 
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over 
resources in the external environment.”95 For Radin, “[p]ersonal property is 
important precisely because its holder could not be the particular person she is 
without it.”96 
                                               
87 Id. 
88 Id. at para. 41, at 4–5. 
89 Id. at para. 45, at 7. 
90 Id.  
91 Guyora Binder, Post-Totalitarian Politics, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1491, 1508 (1993) 
(footnote omitted). See also Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the 
Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1370 (1996) (describing 
Hegel’s vision of the self in relation to property). 
92 See, e.g., Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 447–49 (2014) 
(describing influence of Locke and Hegel on contemporary property theories). 
93 Margaret Jane Radin, Property as Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 977–78 (1982) 
(describing Hegel’s philosophy on property and its relationship to selfhood). 
94 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 36 (1993). For Radin, “[o]ne 
may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship with an object by the kind 
of pain that would be occasioned by its loss. On this view, an object is closely related to 
one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement.” 
Id. at 36–37 (footnote omitted).  
95 Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). 
96 Id. at 45. See also C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally 
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 744 (1986) (arguing that “[p]eople rely on, 
consume, or transform resources in many of their self-expressive, developmental, 
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Despite this rich tradition in Western political thought that ties the integrity of 
identity, autonomy, and democracy to notions of property, most legal scholarship 
and jurisprudence over the last 130 years has moved away from the recognition of 
the self through property protections. Such a departure—where the roots of 
democracy are no longer founded on principles derived from property protections 
and property protections and their justifications are no longer intertwined with 
principles of autonomy and self-determination—threatens the integrity of the 
identity. The next section will explore the divergence in legal thought that occurred 
at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, which separated protection of the self—
through privacy protections—from property rules. 
 
B.  The Emergence of the Right to Privacy 
 
The modern approach to privacy—recognizing it mostly through protections 
grounded in tort law—can be traced to a seminal article by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis published in the Harvard Law Review 130 years ago entitled simply “The 
Right to Privacy.”97 There, the Warren-Brandeis project was both descriptive and 
normative. They described the current state of the common law and what they saw 
as an emerging scheme of protections that, they argued, preserved what they called 
the “right ‘to be let alone.’”98 They also believed the law was moving toward a 
recognition of this right; they described common law decisions that seemed to 
extend protections beyond those traditionally afforded through property law 
concepts: “the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality 
not the principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended and 
unusual sense.”99 Instead, Warren and Brandeis argued that the “principle which 
protects personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the 
emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when 
it extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal 
relation, domestic or otherwise.”100 William Prosser would later describe the Warren 
and Brandeis descriptive project as follows: 
 
Piecing together old decisions in which relief had been afforded on the 
basis of defamation, or the invasion of some property right, or a breach of 
                                               
productive, and survival activities. These uses of resources are integral to a person’s liberty, 
viewed either as self-realization or as self-determination”). 
97 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890). 
98 Id. at 195 (citing COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). For a critique of the 
conceptualization of the right to privacy as the right to be let alone, see Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1102 (2002). 
99 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 213. 
100 Id. In the footnote accompanying this passage, they would defend their claim against 
arguments that they were advocating “judicial legislation” because they were merely 
applying “an existing principle to new cases.” Id. at 213 n.1. 
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confidence or an implied contract, the article concluded that such cases 
were in reality based upon a broader principle which was entitled to 
separate recognition.101  
 
Warren and Brandeis believed that the law needed to recognize this right to 
privacy because the legal regime at the time, in which privacy interests were 
protected through property law, was inadequate to the task of protecting privacy. As 
Robert Post explains, “Because they desired to construct a right of privacy that 
extended protection to an entire inviolate personality and not just to its products, 
Warren and Brandeis believed that they were forced to dismantle the property law 
structure of common law copyright.”102 Indeed, for Warren and Brandeis, the 
existing property-law approach to preserving the right to be left alone was 
insufficient to protect the breadth of the interests at stake, i.e., the “peace of mind or 
the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all,” which, for Warren 
and Brandeis, were “difficult to regard” as property, “in the common acceptation of 
that term.”103 Thus, they argued, existing protections, rooted in property law, were 
insufficient to keep pace with such technologies and afford protections that most 
would find desirous.104  
Warren and Brandeis’ normative claim was that such developments in the law 
were beneficial and necessary: beneficial, because they helped to ensure basic rights 
that they saw as essential to the preservation of the integrity of the individual’s sense 
of self, what they called his or her “inviolate personality”;105 necessary, because this 
                                               
101 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384, 386–89 (1960) (footnotes 
omitted). 
102 Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and 
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 655 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Rereading 
Warren and Brandeis]. New technologies often spark the need for the law to catch up to 
them. For example, advances in collection and analysis of DNA samples has led to the 
argument that such samples should receive property protections in light of these new 
technologies. See Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to 
Mandate Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 199–201 (2004). 
103 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 200–01. As Robert Post explains, “the central 
thrust of Warren and Brandeis’s article on ‘the right to privacy’ is to disentangle privacy 
from property, and the subsequent influence of the piece rests in great measure upon its 
success in that effort.” Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis, supra note 102, at 648. See 
also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1916 (2010) (describing Warren & Brandeis as “stress[ing] that privacy 
was a mental injury and that property rights were inadequate to address the harm”). 
104 Speaking of Warren and Brandeis, Glendon argues that “[p]rivacy was thus, quite 
literally, pulled from the hat of property.” GLENDON, supra note 72, at 51. 
105 Id. As Robert Post explains, “[s]o conceived [by Warren and Brandeis], privacy does 
not refer to an objective physical space of secrecy, solitude, or anonymity, but rather to the 
forms of respect that we owe to each other as members of a common community. Personality 
is violated when these forms of respect are transgressed.” Post, Rereading Warren and 
Brandeis, supra note 102, at 651. On the conception of privacy as the protection of 
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notion of the self was under threat given new and emerging technologies.106 They 
argued, “Instantaneous photographs and news[]paper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”107 Indeed, it was these technologies themselves 
that were threatening to cheapen and coarsen life, both public and private: “modern 
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon . . . privacy, subjected 
[individuals] to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere 
bodily injury.”108 
Writing seventy years later, Prosser would argue that “[t]he article had little 
immediate effect on the law.”109 But by 1960, when Prosser attempted to summarize 
the state of the law regarding the right to privacy at the time, he noted not only that 
most states had effectively recognized the right to privacy, either by statute or 
decisional law, but also that the tort of invasion of privacy was “not one tort” but 
really “a complex of four.”110 These, he would say, consisted of intrusion “upon the 
plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs”; public disclosure, the 
“disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; publicity, “which 
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”; and appropriation, which 
effectively entails the conversion, “for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.”111 In Prosser’s taxonomy, which would effectively find its way 
into the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts,112 we still see the relationship 
                                               
personhood, see generally Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 300 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984); 
Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respects for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1 
(J. Ronald Pennock & W. Chapman eds., 1971).  
106 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 195. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 196. 
109 Prosser, supra note 101, at 384. 
110 Id. at 389. See also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY 
REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 45 (2018) (“By the 1950s, the right of privacy was no 
longer controversial and was increasingly accepted across the country.”). According to 
Rothman, this right “included the ability to stop (or recover for) the unwanted use or 
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness, and was often described as a property right. 
It could be asserted by both public and private figures, and allowed recovery for economic 
and reputational harms, as well as for emotional distress.” Id. 
111 ROTHMAN, supra note 110, at 45. On the right to privacy and the right of publicity 
with respect to the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, see, e.g., Jonathan Kahn, 
Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation 
of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 226–33 (1999); Oliver R. Goodenough, Go 
Fish: Evaluating the Restatement’s Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C. L. REV. 
709, 716–21 (1996). 
112 On the relationship between Prosser’s taxonomy and the Restatement, see Vernon 
Valentine Palmer, Three Milestones in the History of Privacy in the United States, 26 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 67, 91–92 (2011) (describing adoption of the Prosser privacy taxonomy by 
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between property interests and the right to privacy, especially in the last of these 
four torts: that of appropriation. Not only does the name evoke images of seizure of 
property, but, for Prosser (and the cases he would cite), appropriation consisted of 
protecting a “proprietary” interest in “the exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and 
likeness as an aspect of his identity.”113 
Warren and Brandeis were clearly influential—whether in describing existing 
law or making a normative claim—in the private law space, as indicated by Prosser’s 
argument that by the mid-20th century the right to privacy was well-ensconced in 
private law settings.114 They also had a great impact in the public law space, even 
though very little of substance in their original article is directed toward government 
intrusion on the identified right to privacy.115 
The first time a right to privacy was initially recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court occurred roughly seventy-five years after Warren and Brandeis first 
captured the term in legal scholarship; what is more, unlike in the Warren-Brandeis 
conceptualization of it as a private law right, the Supreme Court would embrace it 
in several public law contexts. Indeed, the Court’s decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,116 a case involving Connecticut’s prohibition on the sale and 
distribution of contraception, laid out the justifications for the recognition of the 
right. The Court began by rejecting a Lochnerian117 approach to the problem before 
it—i.e., it would not use the right to contract as the basis for the right to privacy.118 
As the Court found, “We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, 
                                               
the Restatement and the broad acceptance of aspects of that taxonomy in most U.S. states). 
113 Prosser, supra note 101, at 406. See also HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH, ANSGAR OHLY, & 
AGNÈS LUCAS-SCHLOETTER, PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: CIVIL LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION 52 (2005) (“Although the right of privacy 
was originally conceived as a right of inviolate personality, it quickly began to develop 
distinctly ‘propriety’ attributes, which ultimately formed the fourth limb of Prosser’s 
dominant reductionist analysis.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 57 (describing Prosser’s “re-
interpretation of the law of privacy” as “hugely influential” and “was adopted by the 
American Law Institute in the second Restatement”). Prosser would go on to recognize the 
ambiguity presented by the classification of this interest, and whether it was properly 
considered a property interest or one protected through a tort regime. Prosser, supra note 
101, at 406 (“It seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified 
as ‘property.’”) (footnote omitted). For a critique of Prosser’s privacy law taxonomy, see 
Richards & Solove, supra note 29, at 148–56; Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of 
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973 (1964). On the 
relationship between privacy rights and property interests, see GLENDON, supra note 72, at 
47–61; ROTHMAN, supra note 110, at 48. 
114 See Prosser, supra note 101, at 384–89. 
115 While several cases cited by Warren and Brandeis make reference to public officials, 
few, if any, relate to actions against the government. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 97, at 210 n.1 (citing Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329). 
116 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
117 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
118 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–82. 
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need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social 
conditions.”119 At the same time, the law at issue in Griswold “operate[d] directly 
on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect 
of that relation.”120  
Reading a range of cases touching upon issues of privacy, identity, and 
association together,121 the Griswold Court concluded that “the First Amendment 
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”122 For 
example,  
 
The right of ‘association,’ like the right of belief, is more than the right to 
attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or 
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other 
lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of 
opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its 
existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully 
meaningful.123 
 
For the majority, these cases “suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance.”124 These penumbras, emanations, and guarantees create 
what the Court called “zones of privacy.”125 It went on to recognize that the 
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments, as interpreted 
                                               
119 Id. at 482. 
120 Id. 
121 While recognizing that “[t]he association of people is not mentioned in the 
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights,” the Court noted that certain other rights had earned 
constitutional protection even though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, such as 
the “right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice,” or “the right to study any 
particular subject or any foreign language.” Id. Moreover, the “right of freedom of speech 
and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right 
to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to 
teach—indeed the freedom of the entire university community.” Id. (citations omitted). 
Without what the Court called “peripheral rights,” the specific rights contained in the 
constitution “would be less secure.” Id. at 482–83. The Court went on to reference its opinion 
in NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), where the Court held that if the plaintiff 
association’s membership lists were not insulated from disclosure, it would likely constitute 
a substantial restraint on the freedom of association. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. See also 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23 (1978) (describing freedom 
of association). While framed as a right to associational privacy, it is possible to view the ex-
ante protection afforded associational information in NAACP v. Alabama as a property rule. 
122 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. 
123 Id. (citation omitted). 
124 Id. at 484. See also TRIBE, supra note 121, § 11-3 (describing conceptual, historical, 
and precedential sources of the Court’s holding in Griswold).  
125 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 
1238 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
by the Court in decisions over the years, “bear witness that the right of privacy which 
presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.”126 While the opinion of the Court 
did not reference Warren and Brandeis’ article itself, Justice Goldberg wrote a 
concurrence in which he quoted Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead 
v. United States,127 which foreshadowed the Court’s decision in Griswold.128 
The case law that followed in the nearly 60 years since Griswold was decided 
began to chart out the boundaries of the right to privacy, recognizing protections for 
a range of intimate relations and choices, from the right to terminate a pregnancy to 
the right for individuals of the same sex to marry.129 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in 
the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,130 found that state laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage were unconstitutional.131 Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, made explicit the connection between identity and the substantive rights 
protected in the Constitution.132 In perhaps one of the court’s clearest statements 
about the role of the integrity of identity under the U.S. Constitution, Justice 
Kennedy opened the opinion with the following statement: 
 
                                               
126 Id. at 484–85 (citations omitted). With the jurisprudence of at least one of these 
Amendments, the Fourth, there is a long history of interpreting it in relation to property 
interests. See Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment 
from Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 
50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 374–76 (2013) (describing the connection between Fourth 
Amendment protections and property interests) (footnotes omitted). See also Thomas K. 
Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309–27 (1998) (describing relationship between property and 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–
26 (2004) (same).  
127 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
128 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg., J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. 
at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
129 See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 724 
(1999) (describing the “liberal conception of private choice” as “the idea that government 
ought to promote interests in decisional privacy, chiefly by allowing individuals, families, 
and other nongovernmental entities to make many, though not all, of the most important 
decisions concerning friendship, sex, marriage, reproduction, religion, and political 
association”) (footnote omitted). 
130 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
131 Id. at 2589. 
132 Id. Such an approach is consistent with Justice Kennedy’s prior jurisprudence in 
these cases, as Laurence Tribe argues. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 
129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 22 (2015–2016) (“[T]he idea that all individuals are deserving in 
equal measure of personal autonomy and freedom to ‘define [their] own concept of 
existence’ instead of having their identity and social role defined by the state—has animated 
Justice Kennedy’s most memorable decisions about the fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution . . . .”) (emphasis in original) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
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The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that 
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, 
to define and express their identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to 
find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having their 
marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as marriages 
between persons of the opposite sex.133 
 
The plaintiffs secured a victory in which the Court declared that “the right to 
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the 
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”134 The Court further 
held that government cannot infringe upon “identity-constitutive” conduct 
undertaken by the LGBTQ community.135 Presumably, as in the marriage equality 
context, when conduct is so central to one’s individual integrity and identity, a 
liberty interest resides in freedom from discrimination that seeks to curtail such 
conduct.136 Thus, in the public law context, notions of identity and autonomy are 
intertwined and protected, through robust preserves across several normative 




This section has shown that because of the deep connections between privacy, 
identity, and autonomy, public law treatments of privacy issues have recognized the 
right to privacy and the integrity of identity in their own right, at least for many 
intimate matters, like the decision to terminate a pregnancy or to marry. 
Additionally, in its characterization of welfare benefits as deserving of constitutional 
protection as property,137 the Supreme Court, to a certain extent, embraced Reich’s 
view, as described above, that the recognition of certain interests through property 
protections was essential to autonomy, particularly when government was in control 
of such interests. Thus, this array of public law protections, from decisional 
autonomy and privacy to property, helped to insulate the integrity of identity from 
governmental intrusion. 
On the private law side, however, where much of the digital information that is 
so central to the integrity of identity currently resides, these interests do not enjoy 
such powerful protections. Indeed, the move toward tort remedies for privacy 
violations meant that the law would utilize liability rules, instead of property rules, 
                                               
133 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
134 Id. at 2604. 
135 Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1136–
40 (2017). 
136 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50 
(2011) (arguing that the seemingly distinct equality and liberty claims are often linked 
through protections that are based in promoting and preserving dignity). 
137 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). 
 
1240 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
to protect privacy interests.138 According to Calabresi and Melamed, the set of rules 
used to protect different interests—what they call entitlements—should be 
determined by society’s goals respecting those entitlements, including economic 
efficiency, distributional preferences, and “other justice considerations.”139 The 
following section discusses their theories in depth, setting the stage for a subsequent 
discussion about how their rules taxonomy can and should be applied to protecting 
digital privacy and the integrity of identity.  
 
C.  Calabresi and Melamed’s Taxonomy and Its Relationship to Privacy 
Protections 
 
Calabresi and Melamed analyze three different ways to protect different types 
of interests, through what they call property rules, liability rules, and inalienability 
rules.140 This taxonomy identifies these approaches to different entitlements and 
attempts to match the best rule regime to the appropriate entitlement, not necessarily 
based on the common understanding of the nature of the entitlement itself, but on 
how society wants to protect it.141 
For Calabresi and Melamed, where an entitlement is protected through a 
property rule, “to the extent that someone . . . wishes to remove the entitlement from 
its holder,” he or she “must buy it from [the holder] in a voluntary transaction in 
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”142 This arrangement, 
they argue, “is the form of entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state 
intervention: once the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to 
decide its value.”143 By contrast, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule when 
it may be destroyed by someone “willing to pay an objectively determined value for 
it.”144 Finally, the third approach describes what they call inalienable entitlements: 
those where their “transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller.”145 
Rather than basing our judgments about which rules to apply on common-sense 
understandings of the entitlement itself, the authors identify broader, societal 
interests driving such choices, choices which sometimes vary with the context. For 
example, an owner might possess a tract of land. When the owner wants to sell that 
land, she will bargain with a potential purchaser until a mutually agreed-upon price 
is reached. In this context, a property rule protects the owner’s interest in the land. 
                                               
138 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092–93 (describing liability rules). As 
stated previously, approaches similar to Calabresi and Melamed’s property rules might also 
be used to protect privacy interests in certain situations. 
139 Id. at 1093 (footnote omitted). 
140 Id. 




145 Id.  
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But when a factory begins to pollute that tract of land by engaging in activities 
constituting a nuisance, or the local government wishes to condemn the property and 
seize it through eminent domain, the owner might resist these encroachments. While 
there may be some bargaining over the damages she might receive for the nuisance 
created by the factory, or the local government may attempt to offer what may be 
considered just compensation for the seizure of her land, if these different parties are 
not able to reach some bargained-for agreement over the amount to pay the owner, 
the justice system will become the institutional setting—through a liability rule—to 
set the proper compensation to award the owner.146 Thus, depending on the context, 
the very same interest—here, the owner’s interest concerning a tract of land—may 
be protected by, at times, a property rule, and, at others, a liability rule. In these 
contexts, as Calabresi and Melamed argue, “a very common reason, perhaps the 
most common one, for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule to protect 
an entitlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that 
is, it is either unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation.”147 
It seems clear that the right to privacy, or, to describe it in terms of the 
Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy, the privacy entitlement, as currently conceptualized, 
is protected at present by liability rules. To the extent the interest is encroached upon, 
the invader can compensate the victim at an amount assessed through an adjudicated 
dispute.148 As described above, the emergence of the right to privacy was initially a 
response to the inadequacy of the property rules then in existence to protect the 
interests at stake,149 particularly in light of emerging technologies that made 
circumvention of existing protections easier.150 The actual interests at stake seemed 
unrelated to the nature of the interests protected by the existing property regime. 
                                               
146 See id. at 1106–10 (describing liability rule approach to eminent domain disputes). 
While society may need to choose between which rules to apply in a particular dispute, it 
also must choose the institutional setting in which the dispute is resolved, as Komesar has 
demonstrated. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4–27 (1994) (describing different institutions in 
which disputes are resolved as the market, the political process, or the courts). 
147 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1110. 
148 In a recent high-profile privacy dispute involving a professional wrestler, the 
dissemination of a sex tape, and an online news source, a jury awarded the plaintiff $140 
million in damages for invasion of privacy. Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to 
Gawker’s Bill in Hulk Hogan Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogan-damages-25-million-
gawker-case.html [https://perma.cc/B5FF-ZFA4]. The case was ultimately settled for $31 
million. Lukas I. Alpert, Gawker Media Settles with Hulk Hogan in Privacy Suit, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gawker-media-settles-with-hulk-hogan-in-
privacy-suit-1478107236 [https://perma.cc/YDM6-VS9P]. See also Fraley v. Facebook, 
Inc., No. C11-1726, 2013 WL 4516806 (settlement of class action involving social media 
company’s alleged breach of user privacy, resulting in monetary damage award to members 
of plaintiff class). 
149 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 201–04. 
150 Id. at 195–96. 
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That is, they were not interests that existing property rules seemed to protect, given 
the latest technologies and the societal changes those technologies were 
advancing.151 As we have just seen, however, it is the context, not necessarily the 
nature of the interest, that should determine which rule to apply to protect that 
interest. Indeed, according to Calabresi and Melamed, we may protect an interest 
through different rules based on the nature of the context in which the interest is 
threatened and not on the nature of the interest itself.152 As we have seen, the very 
same interest may be subject to a property rule in one context and a liability rule in 
another.  
In the next two Parts, I will explore, first, the context in which the interest in 
the integrity of identity is under threat, particularly given new, digital technologies, 
and ask whether the existing liability-rule regime is sufficient to protect the interest 
at stake. Following that discussion, I will explore whether the Calabresi-Melamed 
taxonomy is adequate to describe chosen approaches to protecting interests in other 
contexts. In these settings, I will show that “hybrid rules” are applied, rules that 
blend components of liability, property, and even inalienability protections to 
preserve critical interests. I will identify the reasons such hybrid rules have been 
deployed and determine whether similar rules might lend themselves to application 
in the digital world to protect the critical interests at stake in cyberspace. 
 
II.  THE INABILITY OF LIABILITY RULES ALONE TO PROTECT IDENTITY  
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
Threats to privacy threaten the integrity of identity. These threats are two-fold: 
first, they arise as a result of new technologies;153 second, existing legal institutions 
do not seem adequate to the task of protecting privacy, especially in light of such 
new technologies. What follows is a discussion of the impotence of the current state 
of privacy rules to preserve the integrity of identity in the digital world, the role that 
private largess plays in the ability to manipulate identity, and the need for stronger 
protections for individual identity in the digital age. 
 
A.  The Impotence of Liability Rules in the Digital Age 
 
We have mostly left digital privacy to liability rules. Yet, such rules have been 
weakened considerably through what are, in effect, four types of immunities: 
contractual immunity, statutory immunity, adjudicative immunity, and enforcement 
                                               
151 Id. 
152 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1096–97. 
153 For a description of the ways in which new technologies are making monitoring, 
tracking, storing, and accessing personal data easier, see, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY 
IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 36–45 (2010); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 
in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189, 189–192 (Omri Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007) (describing role of digitization on form contracting). 
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immunity. Since much scholarship in recent years has addressed these issues, I offer 
only a relatively brief review of the current state of digital privacy protections. The 
first of these immunities is contractual immunity.154 This immunity arises where 
private companies that operate in a digital world—e-commerce companies, social 
media companies, or any company with a website—provide a service through 
contractual arrangements that create protections for such companies when they 
utilize their customers’ digital information. Such immunity is a result of a range of 
contractual agreements that authorize companies to use their customers’ data.155 
Moreover, as described by Frischmann and Selinger, a form of “engineered 
determinism” emerges where acceptance of contract terms is, in effect, 
mandatory.156 Research about the opacity of these contracts makes clear that there is 
a great deal of asymmetry in consumer knowledge about the terms that they are 
accepting.157 While the adoption of new rules for the European Union and the state 
of California may curb some of these practices, more disclosure, if it is not accessible 
and understandable, will not help to limit contractual immunity.158  
The second type of immunity is legislative immunity. In the earliest days of the 
internet, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which contains 
as its most critical component a provision that immunizes internet platforms from 
liability for the content supplied by third parties on their sites.159 A third party can 
                                               
154 The literature on these and other topics related to these immunities is vast. As a 
primer, Omri Ben-Shahar has assembled a wide range of scholars discussing the implications 
of form contracting in OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATION OF MARKET 
CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007). 
155 Nancy Kim describes this approach as the use of a contract not just as a shield, but 
as a sword: not just protecting one party but also stripping the counter-party of rights. NANCY 
S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 48–49 (2013). 
156 BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 209 (2018). 
Indeed, when faced with terms of service agreements, acceptance of such terms is the norm. 
Id. at 210 (“Deliberation is wasteful. There’s no room to bargain. Resistance is futile.”).  
157 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 7–16 (2013) (describing the asymmetries of information between 
consumers and companies). Another aspect of the failure of contractual immunity is the fact 
that even where a company with private information might otherwise claim such information 
is anonymized, and might even agree through contract to anonymize such information, the 
track record of such companies of actually preserving such anonymization in the face of a 
data breach is not strong. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1717–22 (2010) (describing 
the failure of anonymization technologies to preserve privacy in several data breach 
incidents). 
158 For an analysis of tort liability under the European Union’s new privacy standards 
and the state of California’s new privacy rules, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, 
Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 371–80 (2019). 
159 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018). See also, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating 
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post privacy-breaching, discriminatory, or libelous content on a platform, like 
Twitter or Facebook, and the company that operates that platform is immune from 
suit from anyone harmed by the post.160 
The third type of immunity is what I call adjudicative immunity. Many relevant 
terms of service agreements are subject to clauses that require the resolution of any 
disputes under the agreement through arbitration, even disputes involving a wide 
range of consumers that might otherwise try to band together and proceed against 
the company as a class.161 Such agreements might ban class actions or even class 
arbitrations.162 Research strongly suggests that such clauses are highly unfavorable 
to consumers because consumers are far less likely to proceed against a company 
when they must do so through arbitration; the high cost of individual arbitrations—
as opposed to class actions or even class arbitrations—is also likely to deter 
consumers from pursuing claims.163 
                                               
with a third-party user of the service”). 
160 On the emergence and importance of the CDA, see generally JEFF KOSSOFF, THE 
TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019). On the purposes behind the 
CDA, see Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 651–52 
(2014). 
161 See, e.g., Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right 
to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-third-
of-top-websites-restrict-customers-right-to-sue.html [https://perma.cc/2EY5-4V44] 
(describing prevalence of arbitration agreements in online terms-of-service agreements). See 
also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–52 (2011) (holding waiver of 
class arbitration enforceable); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 
228, 235–36 (2013) (holding waiver of class arbitration enforceable even where individual 
arbitration of dispute impracticable). 
162 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344–52; Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 122 (2011) (raising questions about equality and fairness in 
enforcement of arbitration clauses); Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be 
Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 218 (2003) (describing 
chilling effect arbitration clauses have on concerted litigation activity by plaintiffs). 
163 See generally David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: 
An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015) (analyzing nearly 
5,000 complaints filed by consumers with the American Arbitration Association and finding 
them to be a poor substitute for the traditional class action mechanism). Radin describes at 
least four reasons why businesses might insert mandatory arbitration clauses in agreements 
with consumers: they prevent aggregation of claims by plaintiffs against the company, 
adverse decisions of arbitrators will leave no adverse precedent, decisions are secret, and 
businesses may believe arbitrators generally issues decisions that are more favorable to 
business interests because they are often selected from the ranks of retired business officials. 
RADIN, supra note 157, at 133–34. For an argument that arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts bring benefits to consumers, see Jason Scott Johnson, Cooperative Negotiations in 
the Shadow of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, 12, 
27–28 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007). Recent data submitted to Congress from large 
technology firms, which routinely use arbitration clauses in their employment and other 
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The fourth type of immunity is enforcement, or prosecutorial, immunity. Few 
public actors have taken aggressive approaches toward entities that violate consumer 
privacy interests. There is no overarching federal data privacy law. While the 
Federal Trade Commission has assumed some responsibility for policing data 
privacy, it has, at times, proven unwilling to take aggressive action against 
companies in the face of serious privacy breaches.164 While Facebook reached a 
settlement with the FTC for its involvement in the Cambridge Analytica scandal,165 
some commentators argue that the fine, in comparison to Facebook’s market 
capitalization and annual profits, would have little deterrent effect.166 Similar data 
breaches have resulted in relatively modest fines for companies responsible for such 
breaches, and few believe the FTC and other federal entities are fully engaged in 
policing—or have the tools to police data privacy adequately—under existing 
laws.167 While state attorneys general have, at times, attempted to police data 
privacy, they are in a somewhat weaker position than federal authorities to rein in 
abusive data privacy practices.168 
                                               
contracts, show that only a “trivial number of employees, customers, and contractors” have 
filed arbitration claims against several technology companies over the last five years, 
including Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Apple. David Dayen, Tech Companies’ Big 
Reveal: Hardly Anyone Files Arbitration Claims, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://prospect.org/power/tech-companies-hardly-anyone-files-arbitration-claims/ 
[https://perma.cc/QY6T-G56D]. 
164 But see FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243–49 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding FTC authority to prosecute companies for data breaches). 
165 See Alex Hern, Cambridge Analytica: How Did It Turn Clicks into Votes?, 
GUARDIAN (May 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/06/cambridge-
analytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie [https://perma.cc/8SZK-R4DT] 
(describing Cambridge Analytica’s use of personality profiling in political communication). 
166 See, e.g., Kara Swisher, Put Another Zero on Facebook’s Fine. Then We Can Talk, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/opinion/facebook-
fine.html [https://perma.cc/KQN9-N7FD] (describing the Facebook FTC fine as the 
equivalent of a “parking ticket” because of Facebook’s revenue and market valuation). 
167 See Josephine Wolff, Filling the Cybersecurity Void, SLATE.COM (Apr. 17, 2019, 
12:56 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/04/equifax-data-breach-aftermath-canada-
united-states.html [https://perma.cc/UT7S-HY47] (criticizing FTC for lack of aggressive 
enforcement in data breach incidents). 
168 That is not to say there is not a role for state governments in protecting consumer 
interests in digital privacy. See, e.g., Press Release, Letitia James, Attorney General, New 
York, AG James Sues Dunkin’ Donuts for Glazing over Cyberattacks Targeting Thousands 
(Sep. 26, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ag-james-sues-dunkin-donuts-glazing-
over-cyberattacks-targeting-thousands [https://perma.cc/BNP4-TMG9]. For a discussion of 
the superiority of federal law enforcement efforts to those of state law enforcement in the 
environmental context, which has analogies to enforcement of digital privacy, see Robert R. 
Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. 
REV. 2373, 2388–95 (1996). For an argument that state law enforcement actions can 
complement those of federal authorities, see Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in 
Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and 
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The combination of these four immunities creates an environment where 
companies handling digital data privacy are largely free to engage in practices that 
intrude upon the most intimate details of the digital self. Moreover, as Radin points 
out, these types of immunities create a “degradation of democracy,” because they 
often undermine the protections found in legislative acts that are the product of 
democratic deliberation and further undermine democratic self-determination.169 As 
a result, individuals are at the mercy of these companies when it comes to preserving 
the most intimate details contained in the digital world. In other words, they are 
subject to private largess: they are individually subject to the virtually unfettered 
control of these companies. Making matters worse, they are unable to either identify 
these problems collectively or join together, as collectives, to combat them.170 Can 
we draw an analogy between this current state of affairs vis-à-vis individuals and 
the private sector and what Reich identified as the government largess about which 
he wrote in the 1960s? The following section explores this question. 
 
B.  Private Largess in the Protection of Identity 
 
Are there parallels between what is happening with digital privacy and what 
Reich saw occurring in a different context when he wrote The New Property? There, 
Reich saw a growing problem with what he called government largess: the idea that 
many in modern society are dependent on the government for the means of ensuring 
their economic well-being, or even survival: from professional licenses to welfare 
benefits.171 For Reich, the fact that people were so dependent on this notion of 
                                               
Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 649, 671–74 (1994). For the argument that 
differences in resources and strategies of state and federal enforcement authorities lead to 
greater and useful enforcement experimentation, see Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement 
of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 751–52 (2011).  
169 RADIN, supra note 157, at 16. 
170 Daniel Solove argues that “enforcement mechanisms that rely upon individual 
initiative often fail because individuals lack the knowledge and resources to use them.” 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 97 (2004). What is more, since the problems with the weakness of privacy’s institutions 
are structural, and not individual, “individual remedies are often powerless.” Id. Solove uses 
the concept of privacy “architecture” to describe the current state of privacy affairs and what 
he calls the “architecture of vulnerability” which “make people weaker, expose them to a 
host of dangers, and take away their power.” Id. at 99. He recommends that we create new 
architecture that re-aligns the relationship between individuals, private entities and the state 
that “place[s] them on more equal footing,” and “afford[s] people default property rights in 
information or other forms of information control.” Id. at 100. 
171 Reich would describe the nature and scope of this largess as follows:  
 
One of the most important developments in the United States during the past 
decade has been the emergence of government as a major source of wealth. 
Government is a gigantic syphon. It draws in revenue and power, and pours forth 
wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises, and licenses. Government 
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government largess—and that such largess could be taken away at the whim and 
caprice of government officials—made people not just dependent on the state but 
also unable to create life plans, order their affairs as they wished, and reach full self-
realization.172 He compared this dependency to feudal relationships between lord 
and serf, where authorities could demand fealty and compliance with the behavioral 
and political requirements and commitments they imposed. He described the 
outlines of this relationship as possessing the following features: wealth and rights 
are turned over to government; lines between public and private ownership are 
merged; adjudication occurs outside the traditional system of government; the right 
to possession is tied to “legal status”; ownership of rights is conditioned on 
government largess; such rights may be forfeited back to the government; power is 
shared between government and “large private interests;” and the system is 
administered to “maintain dependence.”173 
The current state of digital privacy exhibits many of these feudal features. We 
turn over our digital activities to private entities, “which reallocate[] and 
redistribute[] them in the many forms of largess . . . .”174 There is a “merging of 
public and private,”175 as private entities are recruited to assist government actors 
with surveillance. Through increased reliance on private arbitration to resolve 
disputes related to the use of entities acting in the digital space, we operate a system 
of justice to resolve such disputes “outside the ordinary structure of 
government . . . .”176 Individuals are at the mercy of the private entities holding their 
private information, and the terms of possession of digital rights “may be changed 
or increased at the will of”177 such private entities. The failure to act with an 
                                               
has always had this function. But while in early times it was minor, today’s 
distribution of largess is on a vast, imperial scale. 
 
Reich, supra note 16, at 733.  
172 As Reich would also argue: 
 
[I]t must be recognized that we are becoming a society based upon relationship 
and status—status deriving primarily from source of livelihood. Status is so 
closely linked to personality that destruction of one may well destroy the other. 
Status must therefore be surrounded with the kind of safeguards once reserved for 
personality.  
 
Reich, supra note 16, at 785. 
173 Id. at 770. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. See also VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH 
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 121–23 (2017) (describing digital 
surveillance of welfare recipients). 
176 Reich, supra note 16, at 770. 
177 Id. See also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 206–07 (2015) (describing 
“circularity” between public and private interests in the digital world).  
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unreasonably high degree of diligence regarding the protection of one’s digital 
privacy rights generally means the right to control such information is ceded to 
private interests. Such private interests act with relative impunity with respect to 
such information, and this imposition of a particular type of legal status “is both the 
basis for receiving largess and a consequence of receiving it . . . .”178 Finally, to 
paraphrase Reich, “the object of the whole system,” with its “attention-merchant”179 
approach, is to promote the companies’ interests “in such a way as to create and 
maintain dependence” on such entities for the ability to participate in the digital 
world.180 
But seeing the privatization of public discourse as a sort of “feudalization” of 
speech is not exclusive to Reich. Jürgen Habermas would describe the birth and 
ultimate demise of the bourgeois public square that emerged in the late 17th century 
in similar terms. Although this forum, which arose in coffee houses and salons, 
initially helped democracy to take root and flourish in Western Europe, Habermas 
identified what he called the “refeudalization” of the public square, when public 
debate became commodified through the sale of tracts and newspapers.181 Before 
this commodification, the public square was egalitarian and democratic, but, over 
time, public debate became subject to the laws of the market: unequal and 
undemocratic.182 For Habermas, this process took decades, but, in its early 
manifestations, one could find the seeds of democracy.183 
I opened this Article with a famous quote from Locke, who claimed that all of 
the world was once America: his idea that we once lived in a world with no property 
rights that eventually required division of interests and recognition of rights. 
Commentators during the early days of the internet saw the world-wide-web as 
holding the promise of an egalitarian public square where all could flourish, find 
identity, engage with like-minded people, build greater understanding, establish 
community, and foster empathy.184 We are presently a far cry from that promise. 
                                               
178 Reich, supra note 16, at 770. 
179 For a description of the emergence of an economic model through which free content 
was delivered in exchange for user “attention,” see TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: 
THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS 16 (2016).  
180 Reich, supra note 16, at 770. 
181 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 231–32 (Thomas Burger & 
Frederick Lawrence trans., M.I.T. Press 1991) (1989). 
182 Id. at 179 (arguing that “[c]ompetition between organized private interests invaded 
the public sphere,” increasing political inequality). 
183 Id. at 141–75. For an application of Habermasian theory on digital technologies, see 
generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003). 
184 For the argument that new technologies make the search for identity and community 
easier, see CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT 
ORGANIZATIONS 18 (2008). See also MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE 
SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 15 (2003) (describing the potential of digital tools to restore a 
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Warren and Brandeis wrote about the need for a right to privacy because they were 
concerned with the coarsening of journalism.185 While threats to privacy certainly 
undermine the value of the internet and mobile technologies, they also represent a 
coarsening of discourse and democracy itself, thwarting individual and collective 
self-determination through practices that manipulate the integrity of identity. Reich 
would describe the future, as he saw it, as subject to a growing role for the 
government and government largess in controlling people’s lives, which he would 
describe as the “public interest state.”186 It is a “joyless landscape,” he would argue, 
in which there are “no precincts sacred to the spirit of individual man” and from 
which there is “no retreat.”187 There, the public and the private are blurred; as a 
result, “it will be necessary to draw a new zone of privacy.”188 Moreover, if “private 
property can no longer perform its protective functions, it will be necessary to 
establish institutions to carry on the work that private property once did but can no 
longer do.”189 Or, as Monroe Price argued at the dawn of the internet, when the 
internet was seen as holding out the promise of creating a “speech nirvana,”190 “new 
rules of protection and new modes of government intervention” might nevertheless 
be “necessary to establish the preconditions of democracy.”191 
We now face a private interest state, which Shoshana Zuboff calls the era of 
“Surveillance Capitalism.”192 Such a state not only threatens the integrity of the self, 
but it also threatens democracy itself. For Reich, the dependency on government 
largess for the very means of existence, like serfs in a feudal state, meant that those 
subject to this largess were unable to lead full lives.193 Moreover, he argued that the 
control exhibited by government over the capacity of individuals to live such full 
lives struck at the heart of those individuals’ identity itself.194 
                                               
sense of community). But cf. ANDREW MARANTZ, ANTISOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS, 
TECHNO-UTOPIANS, AND THE HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION 68 (2019) 
(decrying what is described as techno-utopianism). 
185 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 195–97. 




190 Monroe E. Price, Free Expression and Digital Dreams: The Open and Closed 
Terrain of Speech, 22 CRITICAL INQUIRY 64, 65 (1995). 
191 Id. at 85.  
192 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 8 (2019) (describing emergence of market 
in online user activity and surveillance capitalism as “claim[ing] human experience as free 
raw material for translation into behavioral data . . . [that is] fabricated into prediction 
products that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later . . . [and] these prediction 
products are traded in a new kind of marketplace for behavioral predictions”). 
193 For a description of current welfare agency practices that carry out many of the same 
oppressive functions that Reich identified in the 1960s, through algorithms that the author 
calls a “digital poorhouse,” see EUBANKS, supra note 175, at 178–89. 
194 Reich, supra note 16, at 733 (arguing that “in a society that chiefly values material 
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Reich asserted that the range of interests subject to government largess should 
receive treatment as a property and protected by property rules because “property 
performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society 
by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner.”195 With such 
protection, “[w]him, caprice, irrationality and ‘antisocial’ activities are given the 
protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of his neighbors decry.”196 He 
would assert that while constitutional protections found in the Bill of Rights could 
serve to protect these interests, “the Bill of Rights comes into play only at 
extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis . . . .”197 On the other hand, “property 
affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final 
analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the existence of private property.”198  
Furthermore, Reich argues, “[p]olitical rights presuppose that individuals and 
private groups have the will and the means to act independently.”199 But to act 
independently and in furtherance of their interests, “their well-being must first be 
independent”200 and “[c]ivil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights 
will not preserve them.”201 Reich was concerned primarily with public actors having 
too much control over a pervasive set of interests falling under the rubric of 
government largess. Thus, his public law solution called for granting individuals 
greater civil rights and liberties grounded in property in relation to government 
largess.202 Given that today’s threats to privacy mostly stem from private largess, 
which is controlled by private actors and thus largely outside the 
constitutional/public law framework, would a new array of private law protections 
better protect the individual from abuse of these interests? The following discussion 
explores this question. 
 
C.  The Need for Enhanced Protections to Preserve the Integrity of Identity 
 
Calabresi and Melamed argue that we should protect certain interests, in certain 
ways, by tailoring and optimizing the processes by which markets for such interests 
function as society pursues the goals it has for the distribution and protection of such 
interests.203 Such protections might include, in extreme cases, rendering some 
                                               
well-being, the power to control a particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation 
of individuality” and that the growth of largess “affects the underpinnings of individualism 
and independence”). 







202 See id. at 774–77. 
203 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1098–1101. For Calabresi and Melamed, 
such goals can be categorized under three “headings”: economic efficiency, distributional 
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particular interests inalienable.204 There is no doubt that there is a market for digital 
information. The creation of digital information markets is, in many ways, the 
purpose of the generation of much digital information.205 There is a bargain of sorts 
struck between the end-user and the entity delivering services to him or her, mostly 
free of charge.206 The result of this bargain is that the user provides the entity with 
information in exchange for the use of the product or service. In many ways, because 
the user gets the service for free, the user is the product, and the information he or 
she generates in the digital world is then for sale.207 In turn, the entities receiving 
this information internalize the benefits of their sale; the users suffer the externality: 
that is, the breach of the integrity of their identity.208 In well-functioning markets, 
negative effects and positive benefits generally align, so that those who internalize 
the benefits must also internalize much of the harms that their actions generate.209 
Any privacy regime should recognize that those benefiting most from the sale and 
distribution of private information must both prevent the improper disclosure of that 
information and be held accountable when such information is released without the 
proper consent of those affected by such release. In other words, the benefits should 
align with the burdens.210 
Like Reich’s fears about government largess and its impact on individual 
autonomy and dignity, the private, personal sphere which exists in the digital world, 
the “digital self,” is under threat. This has profound implications for democracy. As 
Frank Michelman argues when discussing the virtues of a public law right to privacy 
as a political right: 
 
Just as property rights—rights of having and holding material resources—
become, in a republican perspective, a matter of constitutive political 
concern as underpinning the independence and authenticity of the citizen’s 
                                               
preferences, and “other justice considerations.” Id. at 1093. 
204 Id. at 1111–15. 
205 See, e.g., ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK 
CATASTROPHE 190–91 (2019) (describing Facebook’s profit motive as the driving force 
behind much of its activities). 
206 See ZUBOFF, supra note 192, at 67–69 (describing emergence of market in online 
user activity). 
207 Id. at 69 (noting that, with online activities, users are “the sources of raw material 
supply” that is mined by digital companies for profits). 
208 For further discussion of balancing positive internalities and negative externalities, 
see, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 17–18 (2003). For a description of the private information stored on the typical cell 
phone, see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014). 
209 As Harold Demsetz argued, a “primary function of property rights is that of guiding 
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.” Harold Demsetz, Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967). 
210 Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63 
(1999) (arguing for a system of protecting privacy through which “those who would use . . . 
[private] data internalize th[e] cost”). 
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contribution to the collective determinations of public life, so is it with the 
privacies of personal refuge and intimacy.211 
 
When it comes to our digital privacy, the fact that so much is revealed in the 
digital world makes the digital self vulnerable, with our thoughts exposed and our 
core beliefs subject to manipulation for political ends, not necessarily of our 
choosing.212 Twentieth-century media theorist Marshall McLuhan argued that our 
communications technologies have become an “extension of our own bodies and 
senses.”213 Echoing this sentiment, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the 
Supreme Court in Riley v. California, described cell phones as “such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they 
were an important feature of human anatomy.”214 With the advent and use of new 
mobile and digital technologies, we are creating a trail in the digital world that is not 
just an extension of ourselves; it is us.  
Furthermore, the digital self we cultivate is not just an expression of our 
identity; that self is also manifest in the associational ties we make with others, those 
with whom we identify. While some privacy scholarship has discussed the public 
goods that come from privacy,215 little attention has been paid to the collective 
goods—the benefits we generate by working in association with others, in both 
public and private—for our individual well-being and the health of democracy.216 
When we identify with and work collaboratively with others, we develop social 
capital,217 which, in turn, can be leveraged to solve collective action problems.218 
                                               
211 Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1535 (1988) (footnotes 
omitted). 
212 For recent journalistic accounts that have exposed the extent to which social media 
algorithms can lead to more extreme behavior, see Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube 
Radical, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/tech 
nology/youtube-radical.html [https://perma.cc/J5CL-7QGE]. See also Jack Nicas, How 
YouTube Drives People to the Internet’s Darkest Corners, WALL ST. J. (updated Feb. 7, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-youtube-drives-viewers-to-the-internets-darkest-
corners-1518020478 [https://perma.cc/YY4A-SXN5]. 
213 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 68 
(M.I.T. Press 1994) (1964). 
214 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
215 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self 
in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 1008 (1989) (describing privacy “as an 
inherently normative set of social practices that constitute a way of life”); Joshua A.T. 
Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 389 (2015). 
216 For a discussion of public and collective goods, see supra note 25. 
217 For a description of social capital as being present in “networks of civic engagement 
[which] foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social 
trust,” see Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. 
DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995). 
218 Elinor Ostrom & T.K. Ahn, The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective 
Action, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 17, 22 (Gert T. Svendsen & Gunnar L. Svendsen 
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Moreover, when social capital is manifest in a network, that network can then start 
a movement and bring about social change, representing actions that reflect the 
pursuit of both individual and collective self-determination.219 Over the last fifty 
years, some of the most dynamic social movements in the U.S. have arisen around 
their members’ identities and have brought about significant social change.220 When 
the integrity of identity is threatened and the ability to discover the self and others 
with whom we identify, it chills not just speech, but action, particularly collective 
action. This strains and limits community problem solving, thwarting the positive 
outcomes that collective action can generate and stifling positive social change.221  
When a group of individuals gets together to address a societal problem, not 
only do they face the challenge of addressing the problem itself, they also face the 
dilemmas inherent in any collective effort.222 Collective action problems frequently 
cause situations in which members of a group or community “find it difficult to 
coordinate their actions to secure their group interest.”223 In the classic formulation 
of the collective action problem, when individuals work towards some collective 
goal, their self-interest may lead them to “free ride” on the hard work of others in 
the group pursuing that goal until the collective work of the group collapses.224 As 
                                               
eds., 2009) (describing connection between social capital and solving collective action 
problems). 
219 See LESLIE R. CRUTCHFIELD, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS: WHY SOME SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS SUCCEED AND OTHERS DO NOT 27 (2018) (arguing networks of trust are 
essential to bringing about positive social change). See generally Alberto Melucci, The 
Process of Collective Identity, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 41 (Hank Johnson & 
Bert Klandermans eds., 1995) (describing relationship between collective identity and 
individual autonomy). 
220 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A 
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 103–49 (1978) (describing work of the 
African-American Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through the early 1970s); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 419, 425 (2001) (describing work of the civil rights, women’s liberation, pro-choice, 
gay liberation, and disability rights movements as having a core goal of “forc[ing] society to 
recognize the movements’ constituents as equal citizens and persons who were just as worthy 
as the social norm—namely, the white heterosexual male”). Going back more than two 
centuries for insights, Rubin has argued that it is worthwhile to “envision the Constitution as 
part of a larger social process, the product of a mobilized citizenry whose members were 
either attempting to achieve particular goals or to define their own identity.” Edward L. 
Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 65 (2001). 
221 For a discussion of the role of identity in social movements, see, e.g., Steven M. 
Buechler, Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory, 34 
SOCIO. Q. 217, 228–31 (1993). 
222 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (outlining dilemmas inherent in group efforts). 
223 KEITH DOWDING, POWER 31 (1996). 
224 See OLSON, supra note 222, at 54–55.  
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Robert Hockett explains, “the hallmark of a collective action problem is its tending 
to aggregate multiple individually rational decisions, absent coordination, into a 
collectively irrational outcome—an outcome that is ultimately suboptimal for each 
individual agent.”225 Garret Hardin described this phenomenon through the 
metaphor of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” where individual, wealth-maximizing 
activity will undermine the collective interests of a group.226  
How does all of this relate to digital privacy? Dennis Hirsch has called the 
problem of privacy in the digital world “the tragedy of the trust commons,” where 
abusive conduct on the part of those who come in possession of private information 
will lead to less trust in the digital world, discouraging participation in it.227 While I 
agree with Hirsch’s description of one aspect of the privacy “tragedy,” which 
features the prospect of diminishing financial rewards for those marketing goods and 
services over the Internet, I believe the weakness of privacy-protecting institutions 
runs deeper and has wider effects. The harms that result from breaches of privacy 
do not just limit individual activity in the digital world; they also find their collective 
endeavors in the real world threatened, compromised, and even manipulated, 
meaning they will not generate the collective goods that come from authentic 
collective action.228 Shoshana Zuboff described the critical decision made by 
Google’s leadership to begin trying to monetize the information it has on its users’ 
preferences.229 It was then that the digital Upside Down emerged, and our activity 
in the virtual world became a good to be cultivated, harvested, and marketed. Now, 
countless companies track, store, commoditize, and sell information about our 
online activities. Storage alone creates a problem because any time information is 
maintained, it can be breached.230 Harvesting and sale of such information, even 
without a privacy breach, with little regard for the harms that can come to the 
individual through such a sale, means that companies internalize all the benefits and 
externalize all of the harms that might befall those whose information is 
commodified. As we know from Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, when benefits 
and externalities are out of balance, and one party can internalize all of the benefits 
and externalize all of the harms, society pays.231  
                                               
225 Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of 
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Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1, 3 (2015).  
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DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 105–07 (2d ed. 2006). 
229 See ZUBOFF, supra note 192, at 63–81. 
230 As more information is digitized, it follows that more information will be vulnerable. 
See KEVIN KELLY, THE INEVITABLE: UNDERSTANDING THE 12 TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES 
THAT WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE 257–258 (2016) (describing expansion of digitization). 
231 Hardin, supra note 226, at 1244–45. For a description of externalities in the context 
of incompatible land uses, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 
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A metaphor from game theory can help illuminate the collective action problem 
posed by subjecting the integrity of identity to private largess. One classic game-
theoretical modeling of the collective action problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(“PD”). In the PD setting, we are asked to imagine two prisoners being held by the 
authorities in separate interview rooms. If both cooperate and remain silent, 
divulging no information to the authorities, they can both go free. If one “defects” 
from cooperation and turns into an informant, pinning the blame on his or her 
confederate, that informant will go free while the other prisoner takes the fall for the 
crime.232 The essence of the arrangement is the degree of trust between the prisoners. 
If they trust each other and behave cooperatively, they can realize the optimal 
outcome: both prisoners go free. If they do not trust each other (or one trusts while 
the other breaches that trust), only one prisoner will come out ahead. Finally, if both 
defect, they will each find themselves facing more trouble with the authorities.233 
The privacy problem I have been highlighting adds a new twist to the PD game. 
In the privacy setting reimagined as a PD game, we can, again, think of two 
prisoners. Instead of being held incommunicado in two separate rooms, however, 
they are cellmates. They communicate with each other about the crime and what 
they plan to say to evade prosecution. Research into trust-generating behavior in 
both these sorts of games and real-world group settings reveals that certain types of 
behaviors increase trust and cooperation: for example, face-to-face interactions,234 
explicit agreements to cooperate,235 and even general communication between the 
parties.236 Therefore, we can imagine, putting the cellmates together increases trust 
and facilitates cooperation that can lead to the optimal outcomes for the prisoners.  
Imagine further that the cellmates talk about the crime and reach an agreement 
as to what they will say when questioned. They “get their story straight,” and the 
two are confident that they will both adhere to that story so they can both go free. 
                                               
(1972).  
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The truth is, however, one of the prisoners is an informant and is recording their 
conversation. That informant asked leading questions of the cellmate and has gotten 
that individual to confess to the crime. The recording of the conversation will be 
shared with the authorities and used against the cellmate as evidence of guilt and to 
achieve the informant’s release. The privacy-as-collective-action problem is like this 
new version of the PD game. In it, one party has information that would be 
embarrassing about the other and is willing to share it with others to get ahead, to 
internalize the benefits of sharing the information and externalize all of the harm. 
There is both an element of trust—the cellmate trusts the informant not to share the 
information—and that cellmate is subject to the informant’s largess: the cellmate is 
at the whim of the informant. The combination of asymmetry of information (the 
knowledge that one of the prisoners is an informant), with the ability of one party to 
internalize benefits and externalize harms, leads to a coordination problem, and an 
outsized risk of predatory conduct. Thus, in settings where misplaced trust can 
expose one to harmful conduct, a collective action problem emerges where an 
individual is in a position to maximize their own rational, self-interest at the expense 
of others, internalizing all of the benefits and externalizing all of the harms.237 
The Digital Upside Down poses similar problems as the newly imagined PD 
game described above. There is the direct harm of having our private information 
revealed without our informed consent.238 There is also subsequent, second-order 
harm from commodification and sale of private information: individuals are likely 
to refrain from engaging in exploratory actions concerning the political and social 
identity with which they identify and will not find other, like-minded people, 
particularly where cultural norms might encourage the suppression of such 
identities. Without the ability to conduct a robust search for the self we might wish 
to become, we fail to develop into the person we might aspire to be. Moreover, we 
fail to find those with whom we might join as allies in the search for collective self-
determination. In turn, the failure to engage in collective activities means individuals 
will not produce and enrich their social capital and not bring about the public goods 
that such collective activity and social capital often produce.239 In addition, those 
individuals may face manipulation by social media algorithms—based on private 
information—that lead us to espouse beliefs and engage in activities inconsistent 
                                               
237 This is worse than the free-rider problem identified by Olson. Here, the informant is 
taking affirmative acts in pursuit of his or her own self-interest, to the detriment of the 
confederate, more like the aggressive, rent-seeking cattle rancher in the tragedy of the 
commons imagined by Hardin. See Hardin, supra note 226, at 1244. 
238 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047, 2051 (2001) 
(describing range of direct harms that result from breaches of privacy). 
239 For example, in their study of the functioning of local governments in contemporary 
Italy, Robert Putnam and his colleagues found that in regions with a robust and sustained 
history of associational activity that generated social capital, civic activity flourished and 
local governments functioned better and with greater efficiency than in regions with less 
such activity. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, ROBERT LEONARDI, & RAFFAELLA Y. NANETTI, MAKING 
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 119–62 (1993). 
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with those we might embrace in the absence of such manipulation.240 Thus, in 
addition to the collective action problem Hirsch identifies as stemming from the 
“tragedy of the trust commons,”241 the collective action problem the current privacy 
rule regime poses is one in which the rent-seeking activity of some prevents others 
from both realizing the self they would most want to achieve and finding others with 
whom they can align to bring about any social change they might otherwise 
pursue.242 I have already discussed the ways that the liability-rule regime does not 
seem up to the task of solving this collective action problem. Could property or even 
inalienability rules help solve them? Are there ways different rule regimes might 
help address this collective action problem?  
Protecting individuals and the integrity of identity in the digital world poses a 
significant collective action problem. It is created by several contextual factors that 
have emerged to make up the “action arena,” as Ostrom would call it, where our 
private information resides.243 First is the asymmetry of information, including the 
user’s lack of knowledge about what information is obtained about him or her and 
how that information is used and with whom it is shared.244 Second, there is 
asymmetry of bargaining power, as engagement with the digital world is becoming 
a critical component of contemporary life, whether it is to learn about and keep 
abreast of current events, to find like-minded individuals, to participate in the life of 
the community, to engage in a job search, or to find a life partner.245 All of these are 
                                               
240 See Allyson Haynes Stuart, Social Media, Manipulation, and Violence, 15 S.C. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 100, 104–18 (2019) (describing social media manipulation as creating three 
“primary problems”: improper influence over elections, the incitement to violence, and the 
“tangential effect on violence” from the amplification and validation of extreme views 
online). See also Roose, supra note 212 (describing manipulation through social media 
algorithms); Nicas, supra note 212 (same). Andrew Tutt traces this manipulation at least in 
part to protections afforded speech through the First Amendment and some of the immunities 
described above. Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 285–86 
(2014) (arguing “our discourse stands to be manipulated and controlled in ways society 
cannot reflect upon nor shape” due to immunities afforded to internet providers). 
241 Hirsch, supra note 227, at 70–74. 
242 Charlie Warzel & Stuart A. Thompson, How Your Phone Betrays Democracy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/21/opinion/location-
data-democracy-protests.html [https://perma.cc/67VS-5GFC] (describing chilling effect on 
democratic participation of privacy intrusions like location tracking). 
243 For Ostrom, an action arena is “where participants with diverse preferences interact, 
exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the 
many things that individuals do in action arenas).” See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING 
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 14 (2005). 
244 See, e.g., Michael Kosinski, David Stillwell, & Thore Grapel, Private Traits and 
Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 5805 (2013) (“[G]iven the ever-increasing amount of digital traces 
people leave behind, it becomes difficult for individuals to control which of their [personal] 
attributes are being revealed.”). 
245 For a discussion of the importance of digital access in the contemporary world, see 
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critical to the individual’s formation of the self as well as the strengthening of social 
bonds and participation in the life of the civic community.246 Third, there is little 
accountability for privacy abuses, creating a moral hazard on the part of those in 
possession of private information.247 Because of informational and bargaining power 
asymmetry, and a lack of transparency and accountability when breaches occur, 
individuals often engage in conduct with little knowledge of its potential 
consequences and pursue little recourse when harmed. As we have seen in recent 
years, knowledge of individuals’ digital selves can be used to manipulate the 
individual.248 In authoritarian societies, it is used to oppress.249 The collective action 
challenge of the privacy-as-collective-good problem is that cooperation to protect 
privacy is highly unlikely, and loose practices250 are likely to continue, endangering 
the public goods that are often a product of privacy’s collective benefits.251 
Collective action problems often follow when it is difficult to monitor and compel 
the cooperation of the members of a group. Some structural rules are needed to 
provide guard rails that encourage cooperative behavior and punish breaches of trust 
and predatory conduct.252 The collective-goods problem thus is two problems that 
                                               
generally COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ISSUE BRIEF: THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS OF BROADBAND ACCESS 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/page/files/20160308_broadband_cea_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q88-
XHFE] (finding that access to broadband “provides numerous socio-economic benefits to 
communities and individuals”). 
246 For research showing that connections in the digital world are beneficial for 
strengthening so-called weak ties, which are important for economic and social well-being, 
see Nicole B. Ellison, Charles Steinfield, & Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of Facebook 
“Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites, 12 J. 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1143, 1153–65 (2007). 
247 For a discussion of the dangers of creating moral hazard in the privacy context 
through prohibiting the “indiscreet” to consent to dissemination of their personal 
information, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The “New” Privacy and the “Old”: Is 
Applying the Tort Law of Privacy Like Putting High-Button Shoes on the Internet?, 17 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 107, 126 (2012). 
248 On the capacity for social media algorithms to manipulate users, see Roose, supra 
note 212; Nicas, supra note 212. 
249 BRAD SMITH & CAROL ANN BROWNE, TOOLS AND WEAPONS: THE PROMISE AND 
THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE 289–90 (2019) (identifying concerns that authoritarian 
regimes can utilize digital resources to monitor their citizenry and spread disinformation). 
250 For a description of the practices at Facebook that helped lead to the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, see SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK 
DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 152–55 (2018).  
251 See, e.g., 2 SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 75–76 (2019) (raising concerns of potential 
foreign meddling in the 2020 election in the U.S.). Of course, in the midst of a pandemic, 
too much privacy can also undermine the collective goods when lowering privacy protections 
may be necessary to a certain extent to protect public health. 
252 The existence of such collective action problems is presented by Calabresi and 
Melamed as the justification for imposing many of the rules described in their taxonomy. 
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deepen each other: asymmetry of information and a “tragedy of the commons” in 
which, in the absence of rules to prevent abuse, predatory conduct is prevalent.253 
Calabresi and Melamed argue that different rules might work in different 
contexts to help solve collective action problems and achieve society’s goals for how 
it orders itself.254 With this approach to collective action problems in mind, are there 
aspects of property, liability, and even inalienability rules from which we might 
borrow that could lend themselves to preserving the integrity of identity and the 
digital self?255 The next Part explores this question. 
 
III.  LESSONS FROM PROPERTY SETTINGS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES  
TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF IDENTITY 
 
Calabresi and Melamed’s three-part taxonomy may classify how we protect 
certain interests as either subject to a property rule, a liability rule, or a rule against 
alienation, depending on the interests at stake, the types of problems posed by trying 
to protect those interests, and the goals society has concerning how it wishes those 
interests to be protected and distributed.256 The reality is, however, over the last fifty 
years, interests we might generally recognize as property are protected by hybrid or 
blended rules that borrow from each aspect of Calabresi and Melamed’s taxonomy. 
At the same time, the most robust rules of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy—those 
that could be classified as inalienability rules—may run counter to the notion of self-
determination and run the risk of being considered paternalistic.257 And when one is 
looking to promote self-determination and maximize the extent to which individuals 
can realize their autonomy, rules that prohibit certain activities or transactions, or 
make particular interests inalienable, would appear to undermine individual choice, 
and, as a result, self-determination. Accordingly, an approach that seeks to provide 
information adequate for individuals to make informed choices about their private 
information while protecting against asymmetry of bargaining power will need to 
balance these goals to preserve autonomy and self-determination and the collective 
goods they generate.258 As the following discussion shows, in a range of property 
                                               
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–10. 
253 For a discussion of the “tragedy of the commons” phenomenon, see Hardin, supra 
note 226, at 1244–45. 
254 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–15. 
255 See, e.g., JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW 
DIGITAL SERFDOM 131 (2017) (arguing that “[p]roperty’s characteristics of clarity, 
robustness, and automatic exclusion help cover for privacy rights that are often hazy, fragile, 
and permit intrusion by default”). 
256 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–15. 
257 On the role of paternalism in setting inalienability rules, see id. at 1113–15. 
258 There is a natural relationship between property rules and its protection of 
information. As Fairfield argues, “[t]raditional property rules, including the oldest and most 
venerated, are about packaging and conveying information.” FAIRFIELD, supra note 255, at 
157. Similarly, sociologist Erving Goffman spoke of privacy in spatial terms, describing the 
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law contexts, institutions have emerged that attempt to balance these goals: in the 
landlord-tenant, mortgage, and land use contexts.  
Indeed, an array of rules protect various property interests, and they combine 
elements of property, liability, and contractual protections259 when doing so. Such 
complex legal regimes are often invoked to address collective action problems. In 
fact, the emergence of private property itself has been described as a response to a 
collective action problem, requiring coordination, trust, and cooperation.260 These 
requirements have all been imposed due to asymmetries of information, asymmetry 
of bargaining power, and the nature of the interest at stake to address different 
collective action problems, as the rules around nuisance and eminent domain in the 
property context were designed to address different collective action problems.261 In 
none of these contexts can we neatly categorize these rules as being either liability, 
property, or inalienability rules. As a result, in the contexts described below, we 
protect a range of interests through blended or hybrid rules that do not fall neatly 
within the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy. The evolution of the rules surrounding 
each of these interests follows. 
 
                                               
“[t]erritories of the [s]elf” as “[i]nformation preserve[s]” over which we must assert some 
degree of control. Goffman, supra note 37, at 38–40. 
259 While the Calabresi-Melamed three-part taxonomy identifies property, liability, and 
inalienability rules, the idea of contractual relations, obtained through pre-transfer 
negotiations, is embedded in their notions of property rules, implicitly excluded from liability 
rules, and explicitly barred in contexts where inalienability rules apply. See Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092–93. 
260 CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 37–38 (1994) (imagining the emergence of property law as a 
cooperative effort to overcome a collective action problem). See also Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351–58 (1967) (describing 
emergence of private property regime as a response to the collective action problem posed 
by overuse of communal property); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58–102 (1990) (arguing that certain 
“design principles” help communities overcome collective action problems that arise in the 
exploitation of common pool resources). See generally Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land 
Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008) (arguing for the implementation of “land 
assembly districts” to address the collective action problem that arises in the fragmentation 
of land that might otherwise be subject to eminent domain). 
261 KOMESAR, supra note 146, at 14–28 (describing nuisance remedies to overcome 
collective action problem created by pollution). See also Nestor M. Davidson, New 
Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 389, 437 n. 232 (2013) 
(describing the possibility of using eminent domain to overcome the problem of so-called 
“underwater” mortgages in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008); Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–10 (discussing role of eminent domain in addressing 
collective action problems); id. at 1115–24 (discussing role of law of nuisance in addressing 
collective action problems). 
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A.  The Warranty of Habitability 
 
Roughly sixty years ago, the relationship between landlord and tenant in the 
rental housing market was one of significant asymmetry of bargaining power, 
knowledge, and expertise.262 The need for rental housing in many urban settings 
created high demand and an inadequate supply of suitable accommodation.263 The 
dominant approach in rental housing for centuries had been “caveat emptor”: buyer 
beware.264 The emergence of the leasehold interest occurred at a time when 
tenants—subsistence farmers—were in a better position to repair housing conditions 
on their own.265 The expansion of urban populations and the accompanying stress 
on urban housing supply put landlords in a strong bargaining position with their 
tenants, allowing them to eschew repairs and maintenance, leaving tenants little 
choice but to accept substandard housing.266 In addition to having little bargaining 
power, tenants also had less information about the quality of housing.267 Forced to 
take whatever the landlord offered them in tight housing markets, tenants were 
unable to find suitable housing.268 In light of these forces, courts began to utilize 
contract principles—since the lease was, in effect, a contract—to recognize an 
implied warranty of habitability. The landlord warranted that the housing subject to 
the lease was fit for its intended purpose—i.e., human habitation—and could not 
lease such property without providing certain essential services.269 In this way, the 
warranty of habitability contains elements of all three components of the Calabresi-
Melamed taxonomy. It affects property, it incorporates liability in the nature of a 
tort for breach of the duty, and attempts to make certain types of transactions out of 
reach (that is, inalienable)—for example, the execution of a lease for property that 
does not satisfy the warranty of habitability. Thus, in residential leases, courts and 
legislatures have blended these rules to protect lessees. Therefore, even in a setting 
                                               
262 On the emergence of the warranty of habitability in residential leases, see generally 
Jeffrey Hiles, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Dream Deferred, 48 UMKC L. REV. 
237 (1980). See also Francis S. L’Abbate, Recovery Under the Implied Warranty of 
Habitability, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 291–92 (1982); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 
428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (recognizing warranty of habitability in residential 
leases). 
263 See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 473–75 (Haw. 1969) (describing 
emergence of the warranty of habitability as a response to the needs of urban settings). 
264 Jean C. Love, Landlord’s Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, 
Negligence, or Strict Liability, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19, 99 (1975). 
265 See Hiles, supra note 262, at 240. 
266 Id. 
267 For the argument that tenants still face considerable asymmetries of information, 
mostly about their remedies and channels for enforcing it, see David A. Super, The Rise and 
Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CAL. L. REV. 389, 424 (2011). 
268 For a discussion of the purposes behind the recognition of the warranty of 
habitability, with a particular emphasis on the unequal bargaining power between tenants 
and landlords, see, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171–76 (1974). 
269 Hiles, supra note 262, at 241.  
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in which a property interest was at stake, due to the asymmetries of information and 
bargaining power, and the context in which suitable housing is an essential element 
of human existence, we recognize a blended rule, which, today, encompasses 
virtually all residential real estate leaseholds.270 
 
B.  The Market for Mortgages 
 
While the emergence of an implied warranty of habitability was exclusively a 
state law phenomenon,271 in the mortgage market, the U.S. Congress took dramatic 
steps to address similar trends and forces that affected the execution of residential 
mortgages.272 In the mortgage market, as Americans began to purchase homes after 
WWII, many social and economic forces emerged that paralleled the development 
of the warranty of habitability. Prospective homeowners faced dramatic asymmetry 
of information around the terms of complex mortgage agreements.273 Additionally, 
borrowers were unaware of the real estate practices of lenders in terms of potentially 
discriminatory behavior. A single homeowner might be discriminated against and 
denied mortgage credit, but he or she might not know whether others similarly 
situated and members of a protected class were also facing discrimination.274 From 
the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, Congress enacted a series of laws designed to 
balance some of these asymmetries of information. To this end, the Truth in Lending 
Act,275 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,276 and the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act277 were all passed between 1968 and 1975 to provide prospective 
homeowners and mortgage borrowers with information about the mortgage 
transaction and mortgage lender practices. The context in which these statutes arose, 
and which prompted Congress to act, was that borrowers faced a dramatic 
asymmetry of information related to individual mortgage transactions and mortgage 
                                               
270 See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 445 (1980) (extending warranty of 
habitability to residential premises). 
271 See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, & DALE A. WHITMAN, 
THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.38–6.40 (2nd ed. 1993) (describing emergence of warranty of 
habitability protections through state common law and interpretation of state housing codes). 
272 For an overview of the concerns that animated Congress to regulate the mortgage 
market, see S. REP. NO. 73-972 (1972). 
273 U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urb. Dev’t, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(RESPA): Rule to Simplify and Improve the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce 
Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 FED. REG. 68203, 68238 (2008) (noting purpose of RESPA 
was to balance out information asymmetries in the mortgage market). 
274 For an overview of the emergence of and purposes behind the mortgage practice 
disclosure requirements imposed on financial institutions by federal law, see Joseph M. 
Kolari & Jonathan D. Jerison, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Its History, Evolution, 
and Limitations, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 189, 193–95 (2005).  
275 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. 
276 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. 
277 12 U.S.C. § 2801, et seq. 
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lending practices as a whole.278 They were lured into unfavorable loans, with inflated 
closing costs and associated fees, and with little information about the terms of such 
loans or the additional payments that they would have to make to mortgage 
originators and brokers alike.279 Without sufficient information about the loans into 
which they were entering, prospective borrowers were unable to comparison shop 
among mortgage lenders to pursue loans on the best terms.280 They were also unable 
to determine whether a particular mortgage lender might have questionable practices 
when it came to lending to different demographic groups.281 
To address these issues, Congress passed this array of statutes attempting to 
ameliorate some of these inequities and asymmetries. Under TILA and RESPA, 
prospective borrowers receive information related to the critical terms of the 
transaction in a simple, easy-to-understand format. Information related to the interest 
rate and closing costs associated with the transaction is communicated through a 
simple form.282 Today, through this form, lenders are required to disclose a range of 
information to consumers in clear, concise terms.283 For example, a sample form 
offered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which now has authority to 
enforce TILA and RESPA, requires lenders to set forth, in clear terms, the loan 
amount, the interest rate, the monthly principal and interest rate, and whether there 
is a pre-payment penalty, among other information.284 Through HMDA, mortgage 
lenders must report annually on their lending practices, particularly as they relate to 
                                               
278 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2601(a) (noting Congressional understanding in passing 
RESPA that “significant reforms in the real estate settlement process” were “needed to 
ensure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided with greater and more timely 
information on the nature and costs of the settlement process . . .”). 
279 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2603(a) (noting need for “the borrower or lessee in 
understanding the transaction by utilizing readily understandable language to simplify the 
technical nature of the disclosures”). 
280 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2603(c) (requiring clear disclosure of appraisal fees and any 
related administration fees charged in relation to mortgage transactions). 
281 Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its 
Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 629–30 (2005) (describing public value of HMDA 
disclosures). 
282 Formerly called the HUD-1, this document is now entitled the TILA/RESPA 
Integrated Disclosure Form or TRID. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
WHAT THE NEW SIMPLIFIED MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES MEAN FOR CONSUMERS (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_tila-respa_what-it-means-for-consumers. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/EYJ4-E5UU]. 
283 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, TILA-RESPA INTEGRATED 
DISCLOSURE: GUIDE TO THE LOAN ESTIMATE AND CLOSING DISCLOSURE FORMS 6 (updated 
September 2015) (describing disclosure requirements), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201503_cfpb_tila-respa-integrated-disclosure-guide-to-the-loan-estimate-and-closing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YMW9-F4NE]. 
284 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ANNOTATED FORMS FOR TILA-
RESPA INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE 2, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_tila-
respa_loan-estimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE8L-9B6B] (last visited June 17, 2020).  
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aggregate demographic data on prospective borrowers and the mortgage origination 
and mortgage denials related to such borrowers.285 While there is no private cause 
of action under HMDA,286 mortgage lenders are subject to suits brought under the 
Fair Housing Act,287 based on data revealed through HMDA disclosures.288 And both 
TILA and RESPA offer prospective borrowers an array of remedies, including fines, 
damages, and rescission of the underlying loan, for violations of those laws and their 
associated regulations.289 By combining an information-forcing regime with some 
effective remedies for violations, Congress not only “federalized” mortgage lending 
in new ways, but it also imposed new rules that blended liability, property, and 
inalienability rules, beyond traditional property rules as described by Calabresi and 
Melamed. While the notion of caveat emptor traditionally dominated property rule 
regimes and pre-sale negotiations were designed to allow buyers to identify and 
contract around any perceived risks to their interests, by requiring parties to disclose 
more information, prohibiting some types of transactions and practices, and creating 
liability protections for certain types of conduct, the new regime that surrounds 
mortgage transactions thus involves a blended set of rules from within the Calabresi-
Melamed taxonomy.  
 
C.  Zoning 
 
As with the emergence of the right to privacy as a response to the inadequacy 
of property protections in existence in the late 19th century, zoning was instituted 
out of a recognition of the inadequacy of nuisance law to deal with the problems 
associated with urban and suburban life. As Rachel Godsil explains, “[b]y the early 
twentieth century, it became clear that nuisance law alone was insufficient to resolve 
                                               
285 For an overview of the history and scope of HMDA, see generally Richard D. 
Marsico, Looking Back and Looking Ahead as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Turns 
Thirty-Five: The Role of Public Disclosure of Lending Data in a Time of Financial Crisis, 
29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205 (2009). While HMDA was designed to provide simple 
information about mortgage lender borrowing practices, actually extracting information from 
HMDA can be a challenge, and applying it to assist individual borrowers seeking to set forth 
mortgage discrimination claims in court is difficult. On the challenges of using HMDA data 
in individual discrimination cases, see Andrew Lichtenstein, United We Stand, Disparate We 
Fall: Putting Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1360-67 (2010). 
286 Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Heart and Phase Transitions: An Exploratory Study 
of Congress and Minority Interests, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1729, 1766–67 (1997) 
(citations omitted) (noting that there is no private right of action under HMDA). 
287 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006). 
288 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair 
Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 191–95 (2009) (describing use of HMDA data in fair lending 
litigation). 
289 For a description of the civil remedies available to a debtor under TILA, see Handy 
v. Anchor Mortg. Corp, 464 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
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the tensions between a rapidly industrializing economy and the individual’s property 
rights and enjoyment of property.”290 Zoning rules and restrictive covenants 
typically encompass an array of rules designed to channel property uses in ways that 
solve the collective action problem that can often arise if individual property owners 
engage in activities that might diminish or impede the property interests of others in 
a community.291 Whether prohibiting certain uses in particular areas or providing a 
cause of action for public officials or private actors to sue for damages and injunctive 
relief when property owners violate zoning guidelines, zoning rules utilize a blend 
of different strategies. They do not rely solely on liability, property, or inalienability 
rules.292 They would appear to combine a suite of approaches and remedies that span 
the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy, offering a combination of liability, property, and 
inalienability rules. Accordingly, zoning, too, might be classified as embracing a 
hybrid approach to solving the broader collective action problem that sorting 
property uses is designed to address. 
 
                                               
290 Rachel Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L. J. 1807, 1858 (2004) (citation 
omitted). See also ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 9 (1977) (describing emergence of 
zoning regulations as a response to the inadequacy of nuisance law to address ills zoning 
attempted to address); Stephen Clowney, A Walk Along Willard: A Revised Look at Land 
Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven, 115 YALE L.J. 116, 130–136 (2005) 
(describing emergence of zoning in the City of New Haven, Conn., as partly a response to 
the inadequacy of nuisance remedies to address land use challenges facing the city). As 
Alfred Bettman, who would submit an amicus brief in the landmark case Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), would write in the Harvard Law Review in 1924: 
“[T]he need for zoning arises from the utter inadequacy of the law of nuisances to cope with 
the problems of municipal growth.” Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. 
L. REV. 834, 841 (1923–1924). See also Lora A. Lucero, Amicus Curiae: The American 
Planning Association in the Courtroom, 26 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 1–2 (2003) 
(describing Bettman’s participation in Village of Euclid). 
291 See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1081–89 
(1996) (describing the history and focus of zoning laws in the U.S.); ROBERT H. NELSON, 
PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 154–55 
(2005) (analyzing zoning rules through the lens of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy). 
292 See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW ch. 5 (4th ed. 1997) (describing 
many of the common elements of modern approaches to zoning ordinances). As with 
covenants described below, one cannot discount the extent to which zoning can be used, both 
unintentionally and intentionally, and has been used, historically, to exclude individuals and 
families based on their identities as being of a particular race and/or class. See, e.g., DOUGLAS 
S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT, REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON, & DAVID N. 
KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND 
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 121 (2013) (describing references to disputes 
over zoning in New Jersey’s Mount Laurel community as a “shorthand” for disputes over 
the exclusionary effects of zoning based on race and class). 
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D.  Restrictive Covenants 
 
Similarly, when homeowners and other property owners come together 
collectively to impose restrictions on the collective use of their properties through 
covenants, they are imposing a range of rules from across the Calabresi-Melamed 
taxonomy to curtail and prohibit the use of those properties in certain ways to solve 
collective action problems.293 The creation of such covenants helps to address such 
collective action problems through legal commitments made by original owners and 
imposed on those who join the group of owners bound by these restrictions in the 
future.294 They can have economic benefits but also inhibit some economic activity 
by restricting certain undesirable uses, even if they might also produce an economic 
benefit for some. They also embody “small-d” democratic values and help build trust 
and social capital.295 As in the mortgage context, where layers of protections drawn 
from liability and inalienability rules have supplemented existing property rules, 
zoning rules draw from the full array of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy.296 
Indeed, by using a blend of liability, property, and inalienability rules, restrictive 
covenants can help solve the collective action problems that can arise when 
individuals living together in private property settings agree to restrain their use of 
the properties affected by the arrangement and often agree to bind future owners of 




As the previous discussion shows, the rules that have emerged in the landlord-
tenant, mortgage market, and land use contexts bridge the property-liability-
                                               
293 Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
451, 486 (2017) (explaining how restrictive covenants can be used by homeowners to solve 
collective action problems). 
294 See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE 
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 51–55 (1994) (describing legal remedies for 
breaches of restrictive covenants). 
295 NELSON, supra note 291, at 116–29 (describing values that residential-use 
covenants, neighborhood associations, and other similar legal arrangements can generate). 
296 Once again, in addition to traditional property-rule protections in the zoning context, 
violations of zoning rules can lead to liability, and certain practices are often prohibited 
(rendered, in effect, inalienable). Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092–93. 
297 Restrictive covenants are not the only land trust models for promoting social capital. 
For a discussion of the role of Community Land Trusts as a land-use approach that can 
generate cooperation and help solve collective action problems, see James J. Kelly, Jr., Land 
Trusts that Conserve Community, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 70–74 (2009). As with zoning, 
one cannot discount the ways in which restrictive covenants have been used to exclude 
individuals from property based on their identities. See generally Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948) (holding discriminatory covenants unconstitutional); Mark Tushnet, Shelley 
v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988) (discussing the 
Court’s holding in Shelley). 
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alienability rule divide. I consider them hybrid rules that combine elements of each 
type of rule within the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy. They are imposed to address 
asymmetries of information and bargaining power over critical aspects of modern 
economic life and address collective action problems. Can they offer some guidance 
on potential legal interventions in the digital privacy sphere? It is to this question 
that I now turn in the next Part. 
 
IV.  HYBRID LIABILITY-PROPERTY RULES FOR THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
This final part is the most tentative and exploratory. I have argued that existing 
liability rules are proving inadequate to the task of protecting the privacy of 
individuals who access the vast digital world. This has implications for personal 
dignity, but it also has profound effects on democracy, as the core of democracy is 
the maintenance of an autonomous self that can engage in the process of self-
discovery and self-realization that then manifests itself in political action, and, in 
turn, political self-determination.298 For the last century or so, we have mostly 
protected privacy interests through what Calabresi and Melamed have called liability 
rules. But are there reasons to look to property regimes and a type of blended, hybrid-
rule approach to preserving digital privacy? For Calabresi and Melamed, it does not 
matter much whether one calls an interest a property interest or not in terms of 
determining whether that interest should be protected by a property or liability rule; 
what matters are the goals that society has for the enjoyment and use of that 
interest.299 With respect to certain interests that most would consider “property,” like 
a home, Calabresi and Melamed show that we use liability rules to protect that 
interest in certain contexts: for example, where government wants to seize property 
through eminent domain or an entity or individual is encroaching on that property 
through actions that constitute a nuisance.300 In such situations, we impose liability 
as opposed to property rules because that would appear the most efficient approach 
to resolving disputes over the interest.301 
There are other contexts in which we impose what are, in essence, liability rules 
to protect what otherwise appear to be property interests. In the landlord-tenant 
context, we have imposed implied warranties.302 In the residential mortgage context, 
Congress has authorized robust disclosure rules that override traditional property 
rule relationships, imposing requirements that mortgage lenders provide clear 
information related to critical aspects of the transaction.303 One of the core 
components of the Calabresi-Melamed taxonomy when it comes to property rules is 
                                               
298 Post, supra note 24, at 439–42 (describing the relationship between individual and 
community identity, popular sovereignty, and democracy).  
299 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1106–10. 
300 Id. at 1124–27. 
301 Id. 
302 See supra Part III.A. 
303 See supra Part III.B. 
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that such rules generally operate to require buyers and sellers to come to an agreed-
upon price before the transfer of a property interest.304 In the mortgage context, we 
have imposed additional disclosure requirements to ensure borrowers have 
information critical to their decision-making process.305 
Many commentators have argued that digital privacy should be protected as 
property,306 or that those managing digital privacy data should have a fiduciary 
responsibility to protect it.307 The ramifications of such proposals have led others to 
promote the position that consumers should be paid for their online activity as if it 
were a commodity.308 I wish to take a different approach and borrow from several 
                                               
304 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1092. 
305 See supra Part III. 
306 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999) 
(arguing for a market-based, digital “architecture” that would create a “kind of property right 
in privacy”). See also Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the 
Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1135 n.444 (1998) (describing some of the benefits 
of an approach to regulation of content on the internet that could be analogized to zoning of 
physical space). Speaking in the early days of the internet, David Johnson and David Post 
argued that treating cyberspace as a separate place would have ramifications for a range of 
areas of law but also “should come naturally.” David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and 
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996). See 
generally Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information 
Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003) (describing the 
relationship between privacy interests and property rights in the context of bankruptcy). On 
some of the risks of creating a property right in privacy, see, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 79–84 (1996) (arguing commodification of private information 
could lead to alteration of sense of self); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational 
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2000) (arguing that 
“recognizing property rights in personally-identified data risks enabl[es] more, not less, trade 
and produc[es] less, not more, privacy”); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information 
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (2000) (arguing recognition of a property right in 
privacy interests is not likely to discourage invasions of privacy). Cf., Patricia Mell, Seeking 
Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1, 8 (1996) (explaining that “there is no consensus as to whether 
privacy is a property right or a personal one”) (footnote omitted). 
307 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 170, at 103–04 (arguing that companies that collect 
personal information should serve as fiduciaries of that information). 
308 Chloe Aiello, Tech Pioneer Jaron Lanier Says Companies Should Pay for Data: 
‘Let’s Get Out of the Manipulation Business,’ CNBC (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/21/tech-pioneer-jaron-lanier-says-companies-should-pay-
for-data.html [https://perma.cc/NR6A-PR4H]. For the argument on economic terms that the 
threat of disclosure of private information might increase transaction costs and discourage 
economic exchange, see Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An 
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L. J. 2381, 2397–2402 (1996). See also DAVID BRIN, 
THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY 
AND FREEDOM? 91 (1998) (recognizing that recognition of a property right in digital 
information “would almost certainly produce a citizenry that spends half the next century in 
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property contexts to argue for a more robust and clear disclosure regime in which 
the hybrid rules operative in those contexts might suggest ways to help those with 
an online presence to appreciate fully the consequences of their online activity 
through a series of simple and mandatory disclosures that would be required of any 
entity seeking to utilize individual data.309 Moreover, the sites where online activity 
takes place would be “zoned”; they would have to self-identity and self-classify 
based on the extent to which they do or do not preserve and protect the privacy and 
integrity of the identity of those who visit their sites or use their digital services. 
Such a system would not impose the equivalent of inalienability rules and ban access 
but would identify sites based on their porousness and permeability. 
In the early days of the internet, Lawrence Lessig argued in favor of “zoned” 
cyberspace, suggesting that strict inalienability could be a goal of such a system: 
“[t]he architecture of cyberspace will in principle allow for perfect zoning—a way 
perfectly to exclude those who would cross boundaries.”310 He further articulated 
this notion in his work with Paul Resnick, where they describe mandated access 
controls that would embrace the notion of inalienability in certain internet 
exchanges. However, they noted at the time that such controls posed significant 
governance problems, technological barriers, and informational asymmetries.311 
                                               
courtrooms, filing indignant injunctions to keep other people from sharing this or that snippet 
of knowledge without permission—in other words, a permanent entitlement program for 
lawyers”). 
309 For an argument that clearer, simpler disclosures, particularly with respect to what 
the authors describe as unexpected and unfavorable terms would be more effective than is 
common in most disclosure regimes, see Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading 
Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 579–95 (2014). Others argue 
that message format and simplicity can impact consumer understanding. See John Kozup, 
Charles R. Taylor, Michael L. Capella, & Jeremy Kees, Sound Disclosures: Assessing When 
a Disclosure Is Worthwhile, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 313, 315–317 (2012); Vanessa 
G. Perry & Pamela M. Blumenthal, Understanding the Fine Print: The Need for Effective 
Testing of Mandatory Mortgage Loan Disclosures, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 305, 307 
(2012). For the argument that mandated disclosure is generally ineffective in many consumer 
settings, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–671 (2011). After analyzing the failures of mandated disclosure, 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue that simple, easy-to-understand disclosure, coupled with 
expert advice, can sometimes overcome the problems associated when consumers are 
expected to understand and synthesize a great deal of complex information when making 
decisions. Id. at 743–47. 
310 Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1409 (1996). 
See also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 886–95 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (exploring the possibility of zoning cyberspace). 
311 See generally Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A 
Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1999). See also Maureen O’Rourke, 
Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 703 
(1997) (recognizing early in the Internet’s existence that it might emerge into “open” and 
“closed” spaces where the open spaces contained less valuable information). Henry Perritt 
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Because technology has changed dramatically since the dawn of the internet age,312 
and the threats to the integrity of identity have only become more relevant and real, 
the time is right to explore whether a form of digital zoning might serve the ends of 
protecting the integrity of identity, self-determination, and democracy. 
While there is a value to a dialogue about what those precise disclosures and 
categories of protections should be, and I would welcome such a dialogue, allow me 
to sketch out some of the basic components of such disclosures and categories at this 
time.313 First and foremost, browsing itself must be fully protected, and information 
about browser activities must be subject to “inalienability-level” security. Perhaps 
when shopping for personal items, to the extent we might like a company like 
Amazon or Google to market products to us based on our search activities, we could 
permit access to and use of such information by those companies. But even that 
information has proven deeply embarrassing and violative, as when a company starts 
marketing products for infants to an individual whose family may not know that she 
is pregnant.314 An individual must be able to rest assured that his or her browser and 
search activities are not open to search by others and are not for sale: in other words, 
in this context, we could subject them mostly to inalienability rules.315 
  
                                               
would predict the digital world much as it exists today, where advances in technology have 
permitted the melding of open and closed systems. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and 
Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 324 (1996). 
312 One of Lessig’s early concerns about zoning in cyberspace to protect privacy was 
that technology at the time had not developed that would enable us to know whether we were 
being surveilled in the digital world. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 510 (1999). 
313 I would also welcome consumer-focused testing that would help ensure the 
disclosures were having the intended effect. For an argument that regulatory frameworks in 
consumer settings should incorporate consumer testing to ensure that consumers understand 
the nature of the transaction and disclosures that are a part of it, what the author calls 
performance-based consumer law, see Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1330–45 (2015). 
314 See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before 
Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012) (describing company use of shopping behavior to 
market to customer). 
315 Of course, there is also the risk that users will have a false sense of security when 
utilizing services with such purportedly high levels of security, and that sense, alone, might 
be enough to convince them to share what they might not otherwise share, putting them, once 
again, at risk if that information is not truly secure. For a discussion of such risks, see 
PASQUALE, supra note 177, at 54. Recent reports have revealed that a texting app, TikTok, 
was actually a surveillance tool through which the security officials at the United Arab 
Emirates could “try to track every conversation, movement, relationship, appointment, sound 
and image of those who install it on their phones.” Mark Mazzetti, Nicole Perlroth & Ronen 
Bergman, It Seemed like a Popular Chat App. It’s Secretly a Spy Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/us/politics/totok-app-uae.html [https://perma. 
cc/BGX5-MPH6]. 
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Second, entities that have access to individual users’ digital information should 
disclose how they will use such information: i.e., whether it is only for their own 
purposes and to what ends. Providers will have to disclose simply and clearly 
whether they share their customers’ information with third parties, even if such third 
parties are cloud services providers.  
Third, providers should have to reveal what type of information they record 
about their users. If it is a company that provides web-browsing services, that 
company should disclose whether it sells individuals’ web-browsing history to third 
parties. Similarly, does the provider monitor activity on the company’s site and, if 
so, what type of activity? Does the company utilize location tracking and, if so, when 
(i.e., only when the application is in use, or otherwise)? 
Fourth, to strengthen enforcement, providers should disclose the extent to 
which they require the resolution of disputes with end-users through arbitration, 
whether they offer liquidated damages to those whose privacy is breached, and 
whether they have insurance for the damages that might arise from such breaches. 
Such disclosures will not just strengthen enforcement, but they manifest what might 
be considered a “trusting first move”: an effort that both signals that an entity is 
trustworthy and encourages others to engage in reciprocal trusting actions.316 These 
disclosures (with the others described here), then, can help overcome the concern 
that mistrust will eventually curtail digital commerce because consumers no longer 
trust the sites and platforms with which they share their personal information, the 
“tragedy-of-the-trust-commons” phenomenon raised by Hirsch.317 
These simple items could form the backbone of a mandatory-disclosure-with-
zoning regime.318 One could also imagine the “zoning” to include a “hierarchy of 
uses,” much like what is utilized in many zoning regimes in physical space319 that 
                                               
316 Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 531–32 (1995) 
(describing advantages of the “trusting first move”). See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 19–20 (1984) (describing optimal strategy in prisoner 
dilemma games as “TIT FOR TAT” strategy where players reward cooperative first moves, 
creating positive outcomes over time); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, 
Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2003) (describing the critical role 
of trusting, reciprocal relationships in cooperative endeavors). 
317 Hirsch, supra note 227, at 71–74. 
318 Such an approach could borrow from the principles set forth in the U.S. 
government’s so-called Fair Information Practices (FIPS) regime. For an overview of the 
array of federal privacy laws, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA 
PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION, §§ 5-1–5-5 (1996). See also 
Amanda C. Border, Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive Data Privacy 
Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363, 364–367 (2012). For 
background on and emergence of FIPS, see generally ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR 
INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY, BOBGELLMAN.COM, https://bobgellman.com/ 
rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf (last modified Oct. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3LV4-VW3T]. 
319 See Eric D. Kelly, Zoning, in THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 
235, 253 (Frank S. So & Judith Getzels eds., 2nd ed. 1988) (describing hierarchy or 
“pyramid” of uses in the zoning of land). 
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might look something like what is set forth below. An entity could ascribe to the 
bundle of protections set forth in a particular “zone” and could label its site or digital 
function according to the bundle it has accepted. Accepting that bundle would mean 
the entity would be liable to the individual for any damages that ensue to her should 
the protections that are owed that individual fail to be afforded her.320  
 
Zone 1: Full Protection: The site does not store, track, identify, or sell any 
information about the individual’s access to and use of the site. The entity 
does not require arbitration through disputes and offers liquidated damages 
to those whose privacy it breaches. 
Zone 2: Strong Protection: The site stores and tracks usage on its site for its own 
purposes and does not share any information with third parties. The site 
does not require arbitration of disputes and offers liquidated damages in 
limited circumstances. 
Zone 3:  Moderate Protection: The site stores and tracks usage on its site for its own 
purposes and shares information with third parties (like cloud storage 
companies) that have themselves agreed not to share such information with 
other parties. The site may mandate arbitration but does not prevent class 
arbitration. It does not offer liquidated damages but maintains insurance in 
the event of privacy breaches. 
Zone 4:  Weak Protection: The site stores and tracks usage on its site for its own 
purposes and shares information with third parties but commits to 
anonymizing such information before sale. The site requires arbitration, 
forces users to waive class arbitration, offers no liquidated damages, and 
does not state whether it maintains insurance. 
Zone 5: No Protection: all activity on the site is tracked by the site and third parties 
and not anonymized in any way; it is readily available for sale to third 
parties. The site does not have to disclose whether there are any 
enforcement protections. 
  
                                               
320 In recent litigation over digital privacy, the Third Circuit determined that “a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that” a defendant’s promise not to “collect ‘ANY 
personal information’ from children itself created an expectation of privacy with respect to 
browsing activity on” defendant’s site, warranting application of the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion to this breach. In re: Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 293–95 
(3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original), cert. denied sub nom. C.A.F. v. Viacom Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
624 (2017). 
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Of course, companies should not be able to bury disclosures about the zone 
through which its services are offered, as they do at present, in opaque and dense 
terms of service agreements. Instead, as in the mortgage context, disclosures should 
be simple, straightforward, and clear, in a format that is accessible and 
understandable.321 More importantly, sites should clearly identify the zone in which 
their services are offered. 
Indeed, one could imagine a system for websites like the simple star rating used 
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rate the safety 
of automobiles and trucks322 or that used in several U.S. localities to grade 
restaurants for their compliance with health and safety requirements.323 Currently, 
when users search on Google, they are alerted that certain search results are 
advertisements by a simple, discrete, two-letter tag on such results: “Ad.”324 This 
helps users understand that certain search results were purchased by an entity 
seeking to promote that product or item, and perhaps that leads users to trust that 
search result less than they would if it appeared simply through Google’s algorithms. 
In the end, users engaged with locations in the digital world would immediately 
know whether they are entering a site that is highly protective of identity or not, and 
they could shape such online activity accordingly. Sites that are more closely 
associated with political activities and associational life could ensure that they offer 
those who visit them the highest and most robust protections.325 
                                               
321 Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1369–
70 (2011) (noting importance of simple, clear disclosures). For some skepticism on the value 
of simplicity in disclosures, see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN 
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 121–37 (2018). 
322 Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration 
and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 
258–60 (2017) (describing the NHTSA vehicle-rating system). 
323 For a description and critical review of the effectiveness of restaurant letter-grading 
regimes, see generally Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and 
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012). One could also envision notice that is more 
“visceral,” as Calo describes it, because it “chang[es] the consumers [sic] understanding by 
leveraging the very experience of a product or service.” Ryan Calo, Against Notice 
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2012) (citation 
omitted). As Woodrow Hartzog argues, warnings are “useful in making people generally 
skeptical” and if “the goal isn’t to transmit information but rather to discourage behavior or 
simply facilitate a mind-set, the full panoply of notice techniques is available to regulators.” 
Such warnings can include “notice through design in the form of symbols, interface 
aesthetics, feedback mechanisms, sound, haptics, and any other notice that might not convey 
substance but will affect you on a deep, intuitive level.” WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S 
BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 176–177 (2018).  
324 For a description of how advertisements work through Google’s search function, see 
Kathryn S. Hatfield, Google’s “Google’s Use” Is Your Illusion: Proposing an Agency 
Analysis to Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Against Online Advertising Service Providers, 
25 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 423, 426–428 (2011). 
325 As Danielle Citron argues, certain types of activities and personal information are 
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A disclosure-plus-zoning regime would do several things at once, all of which 
would be designed to overcome some of the problems I have identified with the 
current state of digital privacy. First, it would likely put users on clear notice of when 
their digital activities would be private and when they would not. It would help 
ensure that when individuals wish to preserve their anonymity and privacy, they 
would only visit sites that offer them the level of protection they want for certain 
digital activities. This type of consumer education, which continually places the 
issue of consumer privacy at the forefront of their digital activities, is likely to 
operate as a constant reminder of the topic and make privacy a greater part of 
consumer consciousness.326 Making such disclosures simple, easy to understand, 
and unobtrusive would help avoid the “no-reading” problem.327 
Second, it would force entities to choose the level of protection they wish to 
provide their visitors, which they will have to share with those visitors in advance 
and in clear, efficient, and simple ways. This will have a sorting function. Consumers 
will be able to compare industry practices easily because they will have easy-to-
understand metrics by which to compare such practices, and then can choose 
between such actors when they engage in digital activities.328 It might also enhance 
trust in those entities that do a better job of protecting consumer privacy where it 
matters most, driving consumer traffic towards such companies and away from those 
that are less protective of such privacy, turning Hirsch’s concern about a tragedy of 
the trust commons on its head.329 It will thus create a “race to the top” where sites 
that wish to attract privacy-conscious users to them will embrace a robust set of 
protections for those visitors.330  
                                               
deserving of greater protections. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L. J. 1870, 
1928–35 (2019) (describing strengthening protections for matters related to sexual privacy). 
326 This concept triggers the “availability heuristic”; that is, it would make people more 
aware of the risk associated with online privacy the more they are reminded of the issue. See 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS 209–11 (2019) (describing role of the 
availability heuristic in individuals’ perception of risk).  
327 Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 309, at 552–54 (simple disclosure can overcome the 
fact the consumers rarely read content of complicated agreements). 
328 Moreover, such easy-to-compare data would enable third parties to create indices 
that rank industry actors based on the strength or weaknesses of their privacy practices, or 
even just place them side-by-side for easier comparison. On the value rankings, see HEATHER 
K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO 
FIX IT 34 (2009). 
329 Similarly, while access to certain digital spaces would be considered highly private 
and protective, individuals can choose to disclose their engagement in such spaces in ways 
that can enhance their capacity for cooperation with others within that space and develop the 
habits of “sociability” common in otherwise public spaces. On the role of public space in 
enhancing sociability and cooperation, see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: 
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 761–74 (1986). 
330 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 105–08 (1992) (arguing that with stricter 
standards for compliance, companies that comply with them improve their performance and 
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Third, what a disclosure-plus-zoning regime might achieve, as opposed to one 
that might strive towards the equivalent of inalienability rules in this context, is the 
preservation of the autonomy of the individual, but a muscular autonomy, one 
informed by the simple disclosures.331 By encouraging a stronger privacy 
consciousness, one possessed by both users and providers, it will balance some of 
the asymmetries of information and bargaining power plaguing the current system 
and create “nudges” that help shape the conduct of both users and providers.332 
In the physical world, strict zoning can create impermeable barriers that prevent 
people from different backgrounds and experiences from coming into contact with 
one another, diminishing the richness of human life.333 Similarly, digital zoning that 
precludes the exploration of different spheres through rules akin to those that operate 
to render certain property inalienable (which certainly have their place) would 
function to limit the search for the self and the development of an identity that can 
generate collective and public goods. Jane Jacobs and Iris Young have identified the 
values that emerge from broad interaction across differences that can result when 
people are thrust together in the physical world;334 digital zoning that discouraged 
the emergence of communication across differences in the search for commonality 
would likely lessen the capacity for cooperation, collaboration, and the generation 
                                               
outcomes). 
331 One could even anticipate that users could institute settings that, like Odysseus 
lashing himself to the mast, prevented them from entering sites that did not provide the level 
of protection they wanted. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 273 (Roger Fagles trans., 1996). Lessig 
suggested something akin to this type of approach in the early days of the Internet, which he 
described as a “machine-to-machine protocol for negotiating privacy protections.” LESSIG, 
supra note 306, at 160. 
332 The legal scholar most closely associated with what is often called nudging is Cass 
Sunstein. For Sunstein, nudges are “choice-preserving interventions, informed by behavioral 
science, that can greatly affect people’s choices.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 326, at xi. Such 
choice-preserving interventions are informed by principles of behavioral economics in the 
development of “choice architecture” to help people make better decisions. RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, 
AND HAPPINESS 3–4 (2009). For a review of the effectiveness of different “nudges” in 
contractual settings related to privacy, see generally Alessandro Acquisti, Idris Adjerid, 
Rebecca Balebako, Laura Brandimarte, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro 
Giovanni Leon, Norman Sadeh, Florian Schaub, Manya Sleeper, Yang Wang, & Shomir 
Wilson, Nudges for Privacy and Security: Understanding and Assisting Users’ Choices 
Online, 50 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, art. no. 44, (2017). 
333 Cf. Eric M. Uslaner, Segregation, Mistrust and Minorities, 10 ETHNICITIES 415, 416 
(2010) (describing the benefits of housing integration for promoting trust and social capital). 
334 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 55–57 (1961) 
(describing the “social life of city sidewalks” in mixed-use settings as bringing together 
people from different backgrounds); IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
DIFFERENCE 237–38 (1990) (recognizing the value of cross-identity interactions in urban 
life). 
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of collective goods.335 Thus, any effort at digital zoning would need to ensure the 
ability of individuals to roam and explore and imagine new identities. Yet they 
should be free to do so without the risk that such exploration will be open to 




Reich described a future where the individual was captive to the caprice of 
government as the “public interest state,” which is a “joyless landscape” where “no 
precincts” exist that are “sacred to the spirit of individual man” and from which there 
is “no retreat.”336 Such a state required “a new zone of privacy.”337 In the private 
interest state, new rules, and new approaches, are needed to preserve the integrity of 
the self that is at the heart of the democratic experiment. This Article has been a 
modest attempt to consider a possible approach to preserving the integrity of identity 
in the digital world that would embrace a form of zoning similar to that which is 
used in the physical world, particularly as it is used to solve collective action 
problems. The era of Surveillance Capitalism creates serious collective action 
problems, and I believe that digital zoning may help to preserve the integrity of 
identity and the democracy on which it is based. 
                                               
335 In the residential zoning context, Ford describes the value of creating permeable 
communities, rather than ones that exclude certain types of people from them, as “reflect[ing] 
a form of cultural association and pluralism that is more consistent with the best of American 
democratic ideals.” Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography 
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1918 (1994). 
336 Reich, supra note 16, at 778. 
337 Id. 
